THE  FUTURE  of  WARSAW 


By  FELIX  MLYNARSKI,  Ph.  D. 

Delegate  of  the  Polish  National  Supreme  Committee  to  America 


REPRINT  OF  CHAPTER  IV 
OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  BOOK  ON 

THE  PROBLEMS  of  the  COMING  PEACE 


NEW  YORK 

POLISH  BOOK  IMPORTING  CO.,  Inc. 

1916 

UgaBSggBSBSS 


THE  PROBLEMS  of  the  COMING  PEACE 

CONTENTS: 

PAGE 

I.    Introduction   9 

II.  The  Turkish  Question   19 

III.  The  Part  of  Austria-Hungary   57 

IV.  The  Future  of  Warsaw   91 

V.   The  Causes  of  the  War   141 

VI.  The  Peace  Tribunal   162 


Some  other  works  of  the  Author: 

"Sociology  and  Epistemology" 

Jaroslav,  1910,  312  pp. 

"The  Problem  of  the  Policy  of  State  Independence" 

(A  Study  in  the  Theory  of  Politics) 

Lemberg,  1911,  211  pp. 

"The  Principles  of  Social  Philosophy" 

Vol.  I  (in  print) 


The  Future  of  ^A^arsaw 

By  FELIX  MLYNARSKI,  PL  D. 

Delegate  of  the  Polish  National  Supreme  Committee  to  America 


REPRINT  OF  CHAPTER  IV 
OF  THE  AUTHORS  BOOK  ON 

The  Problems  of  the  Coming  Peace 


NEW  YORK 

POLISH  BOOK  IMPORTING  CO.,  Inc. 

1916 


Copyright,  1916 
By  FELIX  MLYNARSKI 


Chapter  IV. — The  Future  of  Warsaw 


The  map  of  Europe  contains  a  great  political  paradox. 
This  paradox  is  the  line  of  the  Vistula,  which  is  one 
of  the  main  rivers  of  central  Europe.  Its  upper  part 
is  in  the  hands  of  Austria-Hungary ;  the  middle  part 
in  the  hands  of  Russia  and  the  lower  part  in  those 
of  Germany.  On  the  upper  part  of  the  Vistula  lies 
the  town  of  Cracow  where  the  old  Polish  Kings 
are  buried;  in  the  middle  part  of  the  Vistula  is  Warsaw, 
the  capital  of  Poland,  while  Danzig,  the  old  Polish  harbor 
town,  lies  at  the  mouth  of  the  Vistula.  It  certainly  is  a 
paradox  which  shows  geographically  the  political  slavery  of 
Poland.  Cut  in  three  parts,  the  Vistula  is  a  river  of  slavery 
and  the  river  of  the  great  Polish  suffering. 

The  paradox  of  the  Vistula  is  the  strategical  and  eco- 
nomical expression  of  what  Clemenceau  has  called  "one  of 
the  biggest  crimes  in  history."* 

The  present  war  has  been  called  a  war  fought  for  the 
liberty  of  nations.  Ten  millions  of  troops  have  been  rushed 
into  the  valley  of  the  Vistula,  and  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the 
Carpathian  Mountains  there  is  one  vast  struggle  going  on,  a 
struggle  for  which  there  is  no  comparison  in  history.  The 
main  issue  in  this  enormous  struggle  is  the  fate  of  Warsaw, 
the  capital  of  Poland.  From  the  strategical  point  of  view  it 
is  a  question  of  the  Vistula — from  the  political  point  of  view 
it  is  a  question  of  Poland's  future.  On  the  banks  of  the 
Vistula,  justice  is  meted  out  for  the  partition  of  Poland  and 

*  "L'Homme  Libre,"  August  16,  1914. 


the  three  powers,  which  once  upon  a  time  dismembered 
Poland,  are  finally  facing  each  other  as  enemies,  arrayed 
for  a  final  settlement.  The  Polish  question  which  hitherto 
united  them  began  to  be  a  bone  of  contention;  under  the 
pressure  of  military  necessity,  both  sides  were  compelled  to 
approach  the  Polish  nation,  which  ages  ago  settled  on  the 
banks  of  the  Vistula  and  occupies  the  theatre  of  the  present 
war. 

The  time  came  for  making  promises. 

The  proclamation  which  a  year  ago  the  German  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  armies  distributed  in  Russian-Poland 
stated  that  the  armies  of  these  countries  were  bringing 
"Liberty  and  Independence"*  to  Poland.  This  was  the  first 
ray  of  hope  for  the  Polish  nation.  A  few  days  later  an- 
other promise  came,  this  time  from  the  opposite  party.  On 
August  15,  1914,  the  late  Russian  Commander-in-Chief, 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Nikolajevitch,  proclaimed  that  the 
intention  of  Russia  is  to  unite  Poland  under  the  sceptre  of 
the  Czar.  "Poland  shall  be  reborn  under  this  sceptre,  free 
in  faith,  in  language,  in  self-government."  The  armies  of 
the  western  nations  gave  the  hope  of  independence — the 
armies  of  the  eastern  power  have  limited  the  future  of 
Poland  to  autonomy.  The  aforesaid  proclamations,  how- 
ever, were  proclamations  issued  only  by  commanders-in- 
chief,  and  not  by  their  respective  governments. 

Poland  knew  long  ago  that  the  war  would  practically  draw 
closer,  and  she  prepared  herself  so  as  not  to  be  surprised  and 
to  have  a  plan  of  action.  During  the  war  in  the  Balkans, 
Poland  advanced  her  preparations  considerably.  Old  and  new 
organizations  began  secretly  or  openly  to  work  with  fewer  in 
order  to  be  able,  in  case  of  a  war  between  Austria  and 

*  "Nowa  Reforma,"  Cracow,  August,  1914. 


—  5  — 


Russia,  to  form  their  own  military  representation  and  throw 
it  in  the  game  and  fight  for  Poland's  independence.  Out- 
wardly, Poland  made  her  first  political  demonstration  in 
European  politics  in  the  summer  of  1913.  Polish  military 
organizations  and  independence  parties  sent  a  delegation  to 
London,  where  at  that  time  a  conference  of  ambassadors  of 
European  nations  was  in  session,  and  it  deposited  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey  and  all  the  ambassadors  assembled  in  con- 
ference a  memorandum  on  the  question  of  Poland.  This 
memorandum  was  nothing  else  but  a  program  of  Poland's 
attitude  in  the  war  which  at  that  time  was  already  antici- 
pated. This  memorandum  called  Europe's  attention  to  the 
fact  that  in  case  of  a  war,  Poland  would  throw  her  lot  with 
Austria-Hungary  against  Russia  because  under  present  po- 
litical conditions  such  an  action  means  the  only  real  road 
to  independence  for  Poland.  The  moment  when  the  antici- 
pated war  broke  out  Poland  did  not  need  to  make  her  action 
dependent  on  any  of  the  aforesaid  proclamations  which  the 
armies  of  Austria-Hungary,  Germany  and  Russia  distributed 
all  over  Poland's  territory. 

On  August  5,  1914,  the  first  Polish  patrol  composed  of 
members  of  Polish  military  organizations  left  Cracow  and 
crossed  Russia's  frontier,  headed  for  Kielce  in  Russian  Po- 
land. This  patrol  was  followed  by  other  detachments  num- 
bering several  thousand  of  men.  All  of  them  were  revolu- 
tionary troops  trained  in  a  military  organization  which  for  a 
good  many  years  carried  on  the  work  openly  in  Galicia  and 
under  cover  in  Prussian  and  in  Russian-Poland  ;  in  these  or- 
ganizations young  men  were  trained  for  military  purposes  in 
order  to  be  able  to  form,  in  case  of  war  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  a  military  representation  of  Poland.  The  plan 
elaborated  long  ago  began  to  work.  The  frontier  posts 
which  for  over  a  hundred  years  separated  Cracow  from 


—  15  — 


Warsaw  were  pulled  down;  they  were  pulled  down  by  the 
Polish  revolutionary  soldiers  who  were  the  first  to  cross 
the  frontier  in  order  to  bring  liberty  to  Russian- Poland. 
This  happened  on  August  5th — precisely  fifty  years  after 
the  Russian  government  in  Warsaw,  through  the  hangman's 
noose,  executed  the  last  five  members  of  the  last  Polish 
National  Government.  This  date  of  August  5th  was  a  fes- 
tival and  the  day  of  the  beginning  of  a  new  fight  for  inde- 
pendence. At  the  head  of  the  movement  stood  Joseph 
Pilsudzki,  a  Russian  subject.  The  road  to  Kielce  was  open 
for  him  because  the  Russian  armies  retreated  for  strategical 
reasons  and  the  armies  of  Austria-Hungary  had  not  arrived. 
Neither  was  there  any  proclamation  from  any  of  the  warring 
powers.  The  action  of  the  Poles  outran  the  coming  events. 
In  Kielce,  where  for  a  while  no  other  armies  had  made  their 
appearance  and  which  was  occupied  only  by  the  Polish 
troops,  the  independence  of  Poland  was  proclaimed.  The 
churches  resounded  with  Polish  national  anthems  for  which 
hitherto  Russian  government  deported  the  people  to  Siberia. 
Polish  flags  showing  the  historical  White  Eagle  were  once 
more  floating  over  the  city  showing  their  white  and  crim- 
son colors  to  the  eyes  of  the  enthusiastic  people.  The  ranks 
of  the  Polish  revolutionary  army  began  to  swell  by  a  large 
number  of  volunteers  who  were  able  to  escape  the  Russian 
orders  of  mobilization. 

One  must  have  gone  through  slavery  himself  in  order  to 
understand  and  appreciate  the  feelings  of  a  nation  throwing 
off  the  shackles  of  its  slavery. 

On  August  3,  1914,  proclamations  of  a  secret  National 
Government  were  posted  in  Warsaw  which  summoned  the 
nation  to  rise  against  Russia  and  join  hands  with  the  de- 
tachments of  the  Polish  revolutionary  army  which  was  com- 
ing up  from  the  Galician  frontier.   A  young  Pole,  a  member 


—  7  — 


of  the  Polish  conspiracy,  was  caught  by  a  Russian  police 
while  posting  the  aforesaid  bills,  and  on  the  next  day  a  volley 
shot  from  the  rifles  of  an  executionary  squad  ended  his  life 
in  the  citadel  of  Warsaw.  He  was  the  first  victim  of  the 
war.  About  two  weeks  later  the  proclamation  of  the  Rus- 
sian commander-in-chief  was  issued;  in  this  proclamation, 
from  fear  of  the  awakening  revolutionary  spirit,  a  promise 
of  autonomy  was  made  to  Poland.  It  was  not  enough  for 
a  nation  that  had  older  political  traditions  than  Russia  but, 
above  everything  else,  the  promise  came  too  late.  The  action 
of  the  Poles  not  only  came  ahead  of  the  armies  of  both 
sides  but  also  of  their  promises.  In  Galicia  all  the  political 
parties  succeeded  in  uniting  and  in  getting  into  communica- 
tion with  the  secret  National  Government  in  Warsaw.  Be- 
cause of  the  freedom  of  action  in  Galicia  the  center  of  grav- 
ity of  the  entire  movement  was  shifted  from  Warsaw  to 
Cracow  from  where  the  first  signal  for  the  war  of  inde- 
pendence was  issued.  On  the  basis  of  an  agreement  between 
the  secret  and  open  political  parties  in  Galicia  and  Russian- 
Poland,  which  form  together  two-thirds  of  the  organized 
parties  in  Poland,  the  Supreme  National  Committee  was 
organized  in  Cracow  on  August  16,  1914;  this  committee 
until  now  has  the  supreme  sway  over  the  destinies  of  the 
nation.  It  is  a  political  representation  of  Poland  in  the 
present  war  and  it  is  a  nucleus  of  the  Polish  state,  should 
the  conscience  of  the  world  awake  and  should  Poland  gain 
her  independence.  All  the  detachments  of  the  Polish  revolu- 
tionary forces  which  were  in  garrison  in  Kielce,  received  the 
name  of  "Polish  Legions"  from  the  Supreme  National  Com- 
mittee. Thus  the  actual  force  of  the  nation,  elements 
organized  openly  or  secretly,  and  based  on  an  entirely  demo- 
cratic principle,  declared  themselves  against  Russia  and 
formed  an  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary.    The  Russian 


promises  did  not  succeed  in  halting  them  nor  did  so  the 
memories  of  the  ill-treatment  suffered  by  the  Poles  to  a 
great  extent  at  the  hands  of  Prussia. 

The  policy  of  every  nation  must  be  a  real  one,  that  means 
it  must  be  based  on  facts,  on  real  conditions  of  work  and 
not  on  fantastic  dreams.  Nobody  has  any  right  to  condemn 
republican  France  for  allying  herself  with  despotic  Russia, 
although  French  money  subsidized  the  struggle  of  Russian 
reaction  against  the  progressive  movement.  Nobody  has 
the  right  to  blame  England  for  going  hand  in  hand  with 
Russia,  although  ten  years  ago  England  perfectly  consciously 
defeated  Russia  by  the  Japanese  in  Eastern  Asia.  Nobody 
has  the  right  to  condemn  Servia  for  allying  herself  with 
Turkey  against  Bulgaria  in  the  second  Balkan  war,  although 
grass  has  not  grown  as  yet  on  the  graves  at  Kumanowo  and 
Lule  Burgas.  In  the  same  way,  nobody  can  condemn  Poland 
for  allying  herself  with  Austria-Hungary  and  throwing  her 
forces  against  Russia.  Every  nation  has  a  "ratio  status" 
of  its  own,  which  determines  the  direction  of  its  policy. 
This  "ratio  status"  is  the  result  of  historical  traditions  and 
of  material  conditions  for  action.  Positive  results  can  be 
reached  only  through  positive  means.  The  road  to  Berlin  does 
not  lead  through  the  moon  but  along  the  strategical  line  of 
the  Rhine  or  the  Vistula.  The  road  from  Italy  to  Trentino 
leads  through  the  Alps  but  not  across  the  ocean.  It  is  useless 
to  vociferate  against  the  Germans  when  the  ammunition 
gives  out  on  the  road  to  Berlin.  A  certain  purpose  requires 
positive  means  and  the  reality  of  the  means  is  determined 
by  the  facts  and  the  conditions  on  the  theatre  of  a  war  or  of 
politics.  The  alliance  of  Poland  with  Austria-Hungary  was 
the  result  of  the  Polish  "ratio  status"  and  of  real  conditions 
which  already  beforehand  decided  that  only  by  an  alliance 
with  Austria-Hungary  and  by  a  war  against  Russia.  Poland 


—  9  — 


can  become  free  and  independent.  Whoever  thinks  that  the 
decision  of  Poland  was  influenced  by  feelings,  sympathies, 
promises  or  fantastic  hope,  is  mistaken.  Poland  did  not  stop 
to  compare  the  injuries  she  suffered  from  Prussia  with 
those  she  suffered  at  Russia's  hands.  This  would  have  been 
a  childish  policy  or  a  policy  of  nervous  artists.  Not  feelings 
but  interest  decided  the  issue.  Poland  does  not  fight  nowa- 
days because  of  a  desire  of  revenge  against  Russia  nor  be- 
cause of  a  desire  of  showing  her  gratitude  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary. The  anti-Polish  policy  of  Russia  was  real  and  sincere, 
but  the  Polish  anti-Russian  policy  was  in  no  degree  less  sin- 
cere and  less  real.  Poland  understands  and  respects  the 
"ratio  status"  of  other  states  and  other  nations,  even  that  of 
Russia,  but  Poland  puts  on  the  same  basis  before  the  world 
her  own  "ratio  status"  and  fights  for  its  realization. 

Arms  do  not  terminate  war  although  they  decide  battles. 
An  army  with  its  blood  establishes  facts  but  the  conclusions 
from  these  premises  are  drawn  by  the  diplomats  when  the 
peace  treaties  are  negotiated.  The  Polish  question  is  not 
going  to  be  decided  on  the  battlefield,  although  battles  art 
decided  on  Polish  grounds.  The  Polish  question  shall  come 
up  together  with  the  whole  mass  of  political  questions  during 
the  coming  peace  congress  regardless  of  the  form  which  the 
latter  shall  have.  This  is  the  goal  for  which  the  Polish 
hopes  are  aimed,  and  the  work  done  by  the  Polish  Legions 
paves  the  way  to  this  goal. 

One  hundred  years  ago  the  Congress  of  Vienna  was  in 
session.  The  Napoleonic  hurricane  came  to  an  end  and  then 
diplomacy  started  bargaining.  The  Polish  question  was  one 
of  the  foremost  among  the  issues  confronting  the  Congress. 
Who  did  revive  the  Polish  question  in  Europe?  Polish 
troops  followed  the  eagles  of  Napoleon  in  his  expedition 
against  Russia  in  1812.    The  Polish  army  was  headed  by 


—  10  — 


Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski.  The  Polish  army  commanded 
by  him  was  the  army  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  es- 
tablished by  Napoleon  in  1807  at  the  peace  treaty  of  Tilsit. 
Poland  has  established  right  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
Napoleonic  era  a  military  representation  on  the  side  of 
France.  Then  appeared  for  the  first  time  the  idea  of  Polish 
Legions.  By  way  of  Italy,  Egypt  and  even  Santo  Domingo 
in  America  the  Polish  legions  began  their  march  to  Warsaw. 
The  road  was  a  long  one  and  cost  a  heavy  toll  of  blood,  but 
finally  it  led  the  legions  to  their  intended  goal.  The  Polish 
legions  were  not  animated  only  by  hatred  when  combating 
Russia  nor  did  they  help  France  only  because  of  any  feeling 
of  sympathy.  There  were  feelings  even  very  keen,  strong 
and  sacred  feelings,  but  they  were  far  from  deciding  the 
Polish  policy.  The  decisive  factor  was  the  desire  of  creating 
a  Polish  military  representation  on  the  background  of  Na- 
poleonic wars  in  order  thus  to  create  a  representation  for 
the  Polish  aspirations  for  freedom  and  in  order  to  confront 
Europe  with  the  Polish  question.  Liberty  can  be  gained  only 
by  blood  and  iron  and  therefore  the  flag  carried  by  the  Polish 
legions  of  a  hundred  years  ago  was  such  a  flag  of  blood  and 
iron.  The  glory  which  fell  upon  this  flag  of  the  legions 
became  the  glory  of  the  Polish  nation,  and  it  was  because  of 
the  merit  of  these  legions  that  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
was  established  at  the  peace  treaty  of  Tilsit. 

Napoleon  was  defeated,  and  his  defeat  meant  at  the  same 
time  the  military  defeat  of  the  Polish  cause.  The  com- 
mander of  the  Polish  army,  Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski,  a 
hero  known  very  well  to-day  all  over  Europe  and  a  field- 
marshal  of  Napoleon's  army,  was  drowned  in  the  River 
Elster  while  covering  the  retreat  of  Napoleon  from  Leipzig. 
The  Polish  cause,  however,  did  not  perish.  In  spite  of  the 
military  defeat  the  Polish  legions  of  the  Napoleonic  army 


— 11  — 


caused  the  establishment  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  with  a 
separate  parliament  and  a  Polish  army  in  Warsaw.  The  fact 
that  the  Polish  army  helped  Napoleon  against  Russia  and 
thus  against  England  did  not  obscure  the  view  of  the  Cabinet 
of  London.  England  did  not  hesitate  to  support  the  Polish 
cause  against  Russia  although  Russia  was  an  ally  of  England 
in  the  latter's  life  and  death  struggle  against  Napoleon.  The 
attack  which  in  the  battle  of  Leipzig  Prince  Joseph  Ponia- 
towski  led  against  the  village  of  Probstheida  occupied  by 
Russian  troops  commanded  by  Emperor  Alexander  I  him- 
self, was  therefore  something  more  than  a  mere  incident  of 
this  "battle  of  nations."  By  conquering  Probstheida,  Prince 
Joseph  Poniatowski  "was  conquering  the  capital  of  the 
future  Kingdom  of  Poland  under  the  eyes  of  this  Kingdom's 
future  monarch."*  Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski  perished 
and  only  remnants  of  the  Polish  regiments  were  left  when 
the  Napoleonic  epopee  came  to  an  end.  The  blood  and  iron, 
however,  have  done  their  work :  Polish  regiments  have  com- 
pelled Europe  to  look  at  them  as  the  representatives  of  the 
Polish  state.  Czar  Alexander  I  had  to  yield  to  the  opinion 
of  Europe;  and  the  Poles,  although  they  lost  militarily,  they 
won,  however,  a  political  victory.  They  won  the  Kingdom 
of  Poland  which  was  supposed  to  be  the  nucleus  for  the 
future  full  reconstruction  of  Poland.  Unfortunately,  several 
years  later  Russia  has  broken  the  treaty  of  Vienna  and 
abolished  the  constitution  of  the  young  state. 

The  example  set  by  the  Polish  legions  of  a  hundred  years 
ago  serves  to-day  as  a  guide  for  the  Polish  legions  in  the 
present  war.  The  example  of  Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski 
is  nowadays  the  guide  of  Pifsudzki  in  the  present  war. 
Regardless  of  the  military  result  the  fact  will  remain  on 
the  records  of  history  that  in  the  great  European  war 

*  S.  Askenazy :    "Ksiaze  Jozef  Poniatowski,"  1913,  page  292. 


—  12  — 


Poland  created  her  own  military  representation  to  remind 
the  world  of  the  fact  of  her  bloody  and  heroic  existence 
to  force  the  world  to  face  the  question  of  Polish  inde- 
pendence.   The  future  Congress  will  decide  the  issue,  but 
the  blood  of  the  Polish  legions  will  be  the  seed  of  liberty 
when  finally  the  conscience  of  the  world  will  awake  and  "one 
of  the  biggest  crimes  in  history  will  have  an  end."*  This  is 
the  basis  of  the  Polish  "ratio  status"  in  the  period  of 
Poland's  subjugation.   Nobody  had  the  right  to  demand  that 
Poland  should  act  against  this  "ratio  status"  of  hers  nor  that 
it  should  follow  the  inspiration  of  the  moment  or  believe  in 
and  wait  for  the  fulfilment  of  somebody's  promises.  Poland 
exists  between  the  hammer  and  the  anvil,  and  every  other  na- 
tion would  take  the  same  course  that  Poland  did,  and  the  same 
course  that  the  Polish  legions  took  in  the  present  war.  This 
road  agrees  with  the  Polish  traditions  against  Russia  and 
with  the  Polish  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary.    The  rea- 
son for  this  is  a  very  simple  and  a  very  real  one:  the  creat- 
ing of  a  military  representation  was  impossible  in  any  other 
way.    The  first  year  of  the  European  war  has  proved  this 
contention  by  the  force  of  facts.    The  attempt  of  Russia 
to  organize  a  Polish  legion  in  Warsaw  against  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany  failed  sadly  and  there  is  no  Polish 
legion  siding  with  Russia.    On  the  other  hand,  the  Polish 
legions  against  Russia  and  in  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary 
are  developing  fast  and  have  reached  already  the  figure  of 
many  thousands  of  men.    The  evacuation  of  Warsaw  in- 
creased the  numerical  strength  of  the  Polish  legions  con- 
siderably.   So  the  actual  facts  proved  which  side  showed 
more  possibility  and  actual  opportunity :  the  decision  proved 
to  be  a  practical  one  against  Russia  and  for  an  alliance  with 
Austria-Hungary. 

*  Clemenceau,  1.  c. 


—  13  — 


Poland  is  not  a  free  country.    Every  male  citizen  in 
Poland  is  compelled  to  serve  in  either  the  Russian  or  the 
German  or  the  Austro-Hungarian  army.    The  outbreak  of 
the  war  came  as  suddenly  as  a  thunder-bolt  from  a  clear 
sky.    The  mobilization  in  Russia,  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  took  about  a  million  men  away  from  Poland  within 
twenty-four  hours.    The  rest  of  able-bodied  Polish  men 
were  confronted  by  the  possibility  of  being  called  to  the 
colors  as  the  war  continued.    To-day  we  can  safely  say 
that  after  the  first  year  of  the  war  is  over  there  remained 
in  Poland  only  women,  children  and  old  people.    How  could 
an  army  be  formed  under  such  conditions?   The  best  judg- 
ment and  the  greatest  sympathies  cannot  possibly  raise  an 
army  when  men  are  lacking.    Recruiting  cannot  be  done  on 
the  moon  nor  can  officers  be  made  over  night  and  the 
question  of  an  army  is  not  a  question  of  improvising  one. 
The  mobilization  of  the  Polish  Legions  therefore  on  the 
background  of  the  mobilization  in  Russia,  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  could  only  be  conducted  on  the  basis  of 
the  logic  of  actual  conditions  and  not  on  the  basis  of 
feelings,  of  sympathies  or  dispositions.    The  territory  in 
which  the  recruiting  for  Polish  Legions  was  possible  was 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  in  the  Kingdom  of  Poland. 
Galicia  and  Posen  could  not  furnish  an  adequate  supply  of 
recruits  because  they  form  together  only  20  per  cent,  of 
the  historical  territory  of  Poland,  and  besides  the  mobili- 
zation of  Austria-Hungary  and  of  Germany  goes  quicker 
than  the  mobilization  of  Russia.    This  is  the  first  fact  of 
great  importance,  because  owing  to  this  fact  the  Russian 
mobilization  was  compelled  to  leave  against  its  very  inten- 
tions a  large  material  of  men  for  purpose  of  Polish  policy. 
It  was  of  no  less  importance  that  the  Russian  mobilization 
is   less   exact,   that  it   proceeds   more  slowly,   and  that 


—  14  — 


Russia  possesses  80  per  cent,  of  the  Polish  historical  terri- 
tory and  the  old  Polish  capital  of  Warsaw.  Those  were  the 
real  conditions  which  regardless  of  the  sympathies  or  the 
antipathies  decided  beforehand  that  by  waging  war  against 
Russia  only  on  the  territory  of  Russian-Poland  could  the 
recruiting  for  the  Polish  Legions  have  any  chance  of  suc- 
cess. 

The  map  will  show  that  the  frontiers  of  Russian-Poland 
are  flanked  on  the  north  by  the  Prussian  frontier  and  on 
the  south  by  the  frontier  of  Galicia.  In  case  of  war  there 
was  a  danger  for  the  Russian  armies  in  Russian-Poland  that 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  which  have  a  speedier 
mobilization,  would  by  a  flank  attack  from  the  north  and 
from  the  south,  cut  them  off  on  the  Vistula  and  destroy 
them  before  the  reserves  from  the  interior  of  Russia  would 
be  able  to  reach  the  theatre  of  war.  Russia  was  made 
aware  of  this  danger  long  ago  by  come  of  her  best  generals 
such  as  Dragomirow,  Hurko  and  even  Kuropatkin.  Accord- 
ing to  their  judgment  Russia  had  to  evacuate  in  the  first 
few  weeks  of  the  war  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  for 
strategical  reasons  so  that  the  reserves  coming  up  from  the 
interior  of  Russia  would  have  a  shorter  road  for  getting 
to  the  battle  line  and  thus  be  able  to  reach  the  seat  of  war 
before  the  armies  of  the  enemy  would  be  able  to  move  for- 
ward from  the  north  and  from  the  south.  This  was  known 
both  in  Poland  and  in  Western  Europe.  France  was  afraid 
of  this  possibility  as  France  was  compelled  to  depend  on 
a  speedy  offensive  movement  of  Russia  in  the  direction  of 
Berlin  and  on  this  plan  were  based  the  hopes  of  France 
to  protect  Paris  from  a  violent  onrush  of  the  German  armies. 
This  was  a  decisive  fact  for  Poland.  The  evacuation  of  the 
western  provinces  of  Russian-Poland  by  the  Russians  meant 
in  case  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  stopping  of  the 


—  15  — 


Russian  mobilization  in  these  districts.  The  western  dis- 
tricts of  Russian-Poland  are  chiefly  industrial.  Here  are 
to  be  found  large  coal  mines  in  the  valley  of  Dabrowa  and 
of  Sosnowiec,  and  besides  there  is  a  number  of  industrial 
centres  such  as  Cz§stochowa  or  Nowo-Radomsk.  The  out- 
break of  the  war  closed  the  factories  and  the  mines:  the 
masses  of  laboring  men  were  thrown  out  of  employment, 
and  as  Russia  had  to  retreat  there  was  left  for  the  Polish 
legions  ready  and  very  useful  material  of  men.  Thus  the 
Polish  legions  recruited  the  majority  of  their  soldiers  from 
these  sections  of  the  country.  Eighty  per  cent,  of  the 
soldiers  in  the  Polish  Legions  were  recruited  in  Russian- 
Poland  and  the  majority  among  them  came  from  the  indus- 
trial districts  which  Russia  had  to  evacuate  in  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  temporarily  for  strategical  reasons.  This 
was  an  anticipated  fact  but  still  it  played  a  decisive  part 
in  the  Polish  policy.  The  mobilization  of  Poland  had  to  be 
necessarily  directed  against  Russia  if  it  was  to  be  of  any 
use  and  if  it  was  to  give  results. 

The  rest  of  the  task  of  organization  rested  with  Galicia 
which  for  over  half  a  century  enjoyed  the  benefits  of 
autonomy  within  the  general  constitution  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary. "Galicia  has  not  been  unhappy."*  In  Posen  there 
are  no  Polish  schools  nor  Polish  university:  in  Russian- 
Poland  there  was  a  university,  but  a  Russian  one,  and  all 
schools  were  Russian  too  while  private  schools  suffered  from 
exceedingly  heavy  restrictions  on  the  part  of  the  Russian 
Government.  In  Posen,  the  Commission  of  Colonization 
originated  by  Bismarck  bought  up  Polish  land  and  settled 
it  with  Germans.  In  Russian- Poland  the  "Bank  wloscianski" 
has  done  the  same  for  over  fifty  years  and  colonizes  Polish 

*  "The  Germans,"  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914,  page  12. 


—  16  — 


land  with  Orthodox  Russian  peasants.  In  Lithuania  and 
Little  Russia  the  Poles  are  absolutely  forbidden  to  buy  land 
nor  to  sell  to  anyone  except  a  Russian.  Thus  a  Pole  can- 
not acquire  land  which  actually  belongs  to  the  Poles,  neither 
in  Lithuania  or  in  Little  Russia.  Czar  Nicholas  I  invented 
the  system  of  destroying  the  Polish  nation  and  Bismarck 
became  his  apt  pupil.  This  was  done  very  much  to  the 
disadvantage  of  Russia  and  of  Germany  and  brought  great 
harm  to  Poland.  The  development  of  the  Polish  nation  thus 
remained  under  the  most  trying  conditions,  whereby  great 
mistakes  were  committed  in  Petrograd  with  regard  to 
the  Polish  question  and  still  greater  ones  were  committed 
by  Berlin.  The  friendship  between  Germany  and  Russia 
was  the  basis  for  oppressing  Poland.  The  celebration  of 
the  500th  anniversary  of  the  victory  of  Grunwald,  where 
the  combined  forces  of  Poland  and  Lithuania  annihilated 
the  power  of  the  Teutonic  Knights,  could  not  be  celebrated 
in  Warsaw  but  only  in  Cracow  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
not  Russia  but  Austria-Hungary  was  in  alliance  with  Ger- 
many. The  monument  of  the  victory  over  the  Germans 
could  be  erected,  and  in  fact  still  stands  in  Cracow  but 
could  not  possibly  stand  in  Warsaw.  This  is  enough  said 
to  the  initiated.  It  is  a  basis  for  understanding  the  policy 
of  Poland  in  the  present  war.  Owing  to  her  autonomical 
freedom  Galicia  was  able  to  become  the  territory  on  which 
the  preparations  for  the  future  war  of  independence  could 
be  carried  on.  The  best  material  of  men  from  Russian- 
Poland  took  refuge  in  Galicia  where  these  elements  could 
be  instructed  militarily  in  special  Polish  military  organiza- 
tions. Thus  Galicia  educated  the  officers  for  the  present 
Polish  legions  and  only  Galicia  was  able  to  do  it.  The 
first  detachments  of  the  Polish  Legions  which  crossed  the 
Russian  frontier  north  of  Cracow  were  skeleton  detach- 


—  17  — 


ments  composed  only  of  officers  and  under-officers.  On  the 
left  bank  of  the  Vistula  there  were  waiting  for  them  the 
Polish  recruits  who  were  spared  by  the  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion and  only  too  anxious  to  fight  for  their  own  sacred 
cause  of  independence. 

This,  however,  was  an  old  program  and  not  a  new  one 
by  any  means. 

In  the  years  1876-1878  when  there  was  a  danger  of  a 
war  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  on  account  of 
the  Balkan  situation  all  the  political  parties  of  Poland  united 
in  order  to  prepare  a  new  revolution  against  Russia  in  alli- 
ance with  Austria-Hungary.  For  this  purpose  a  "Con- 
federation of  the  Polish  Nation"  was  formed  which  played 
the  part  of  a  political  representation  of  the  nation.  The 
movement  was  headed  by  Prince  Sapieha  who  was  assisted 
by  Rev.  Albin  Dunajewski  who  subsequently  was  Bishop 
of  Cracow  and  Cardinal  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. 
In  those  times  England  was  on  terms  of  friendship  with 
Germany  and  protected  Constantinople  from  the  appetite 
of  Russia.  Thus  England  worked  behind  the  stage  in  organ- 
izing a  Polish  revolution  against  Russia.  The  plan  of  the 
revolution  consisted  of  marching  armed  and  well  organ- 
ized detachments  of  revolutionary  armies  into  Russian- 
Poland  from  Galicia:  these  detachments  were  intended  to 
be  the  nucleus  of  the  future  Polish  army.  Russian-Poland 
was  expected  to  furnish  the  men  and  Galicia  the  officers. 
The  English  Government  was  well  informed  of  the  entire 
plan  and  even  promised  to  help  quietly  by  furnishing  arms 
and  money.  Cardinal  Manning,  who  was  famous  all  over 
England  took  part  in  a  secret  meeting  of  Polish  politicians 
in  Vienna:  at  this  meeting  important  decisions  were  taken 
in  case  the  war  should  really  break  out.  There  was  no  war, 
however,  but  the  Congress  of  Berlin  completed  the  diplo- 


—  18  — 


matic  defeat  of  Russia.  A  tradition  was  left  behind  in 
Poland,  however,  to  that  effect  that  England  has  under- 
stood the  Polish  "ratio  status"  which  prompted  the  Poles 
to  avail  themselves  of  their  liberties  in  Galicia  in  order 
to  prepare  a  revolution  in  Russian-Poland.  For  forty  years 
ever  since  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  Poland  did  not  discon- 
tinue her  policy  and  constantly  instructed  young  men  in 
secret  and  in  open  organizations  of  military  nature.  Poland's 
policy  was  not  altered  by  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary 
entered  into  an  alliance  with  Germany  which  has  lasted 
for  over  thirty  years  and  furnished  ample  time  to  recon- 
sider the  matter:  Poland's  policy  was  not  altered  even 
when  Prussia  began  a  systematic  oppression  in  Posen  and 
England  failed  to  protest  against  such  treatment  of  the 
Poles.  Just  at  this  particular  time  England  ceded  Heligo- 
land which  became  the  basis  for  Germany's  naval  power. 
Several  years  later  England  preferred  to  threaten  France 
with  war  on  account  of  the  Fashoda  incident  than  to  inter- 
vene at  Berlin  for  the  protection  of  the  Poles  although 
the  oppression  of  the  Poles  in  Posen  by  Prussia  violated  the 
treaty  of  Vienna  of  1815.  Bismarck  was  not  fond  of  the 
sea  and  Poland  is  not  Belgium  and  Warsaw  does  not  face 
London.  Poland  felt  bitterly  over  being  abandoned  to  her 
fate  by  Western  Europe,  but  she  did  not  deter  her  from  fol- 
lowing her  anti-Russian  policy. 

When  after  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
in  1908  by  Austria-Hungary,  the  danger  of  war  became 
imminent  to  Poland,  new  organizations  were  added  to  those 
which  existed  since  the  time  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin  and 
preparations  were  going  on  feverishly.  The  Polish  "ratio 
status"  did  not  change  at  all  since  the  time  when  Cardinal 
Manning  conferred  in  Vienna  with  representatives  of  Poland 
on  the  details  of  a  revolution  against  Russia.  To-day  Eng- 


—  19  — 


land  is  militarily  allied  with  Russia:  the  English  tactics 
changed,  but  the  conditions  in  Poland  did  not.  Cardinal 
Dunajewski  is  also  dead,  but  another  dignitary  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  Bishop  Bandurski,  is  a  member  of  the 
Supreme  National  Committee.  The  only  change  that  has 
occurred  is  that  Poland's  sufferings  became  greater  and 
deeper.  Should  this  be  the  reason  why  England  no  longer 
understands  the  Polish  "ratio  status,"  although  England  has 
understood  it  and  recognized  it  forty  years  ago  under 
analogous  conditions  for  Poland? 

Poland  has  been  and  is  still  in  a  most  precarious  position. 
She  could  not  do  anything  else  but  fight  against  Russia, 
and  in  order  to  do  this  she  had  to  draw  her  recruits  from 
Russian-Poland  and  her  supply  of  officers  from  Galicia. 
This  was  not  prompted  by  feelings  but  by  actual  conditions 
of  things.  Not  because  of  blind  hatred  but  because  of  absolute 
necessity  was  Poland  compelled  to  direct  her  main  attacks 
against  Russia.  Warsaw  the  Capital  of  Poland  and  besides 
eighty  per  cent,  of  Poland's  territory  was  in  Russia's  hands 
or  in  other  words,  Russia  held  the  trunk  of  Poland's  body. 
It  is  therefore  quite  natural  that  the  Polish  attack  had  to 
be  directed  against  Russia. 

On  October  2,  1914,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
drafted  a  diplomatic  note  addressed  to  all  neutral  coun- 
tries in  which  the  said  government  officially  recognized  the 
Polish  Legions  as  combatants.  This  important  document 
ended  as  follows : 

"Any  action  on  the  part  of  Russia  which  would  imply  a 
refusal  to  recognize  the  Polish  Legions  as  a  combatant 
party  would  constitute  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Convention  of  The  Hague  and  against  which  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Austria-Hungary  already  now  files  a  most  cate- 
gorical protest." 


—  20  — 


This  note  was  published  by  the  "Fremdenblatt"  of  Vienna, 
which  is  the  official  organ  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Thus  the  Polish  military  representation  obtained  an  official 
sanction.  The  Polish  soldier  became  a  political  factor  in 
Europe  because  the  note  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment secured  for  him  the  protection  of  international  law. 
The  future  peace  congress  has  therefore  a  perfect  freedom 
of  action  with  regard  to  the  Polish  question.  When  some 
time  in  the  future  the  hostilities  will  be  suspended  this 
moment  will  find  the  Polish  Legions  in  the  field.  Regard- 
less of  the  military  result  of  the  war  this  is  going  to  be  a 
fact  which  from  the  former  point  of  view  will  greatly  facili- 
tate the  reviving  of  the  Polish  question  at  the  time  of  the 
coming  peace  congress.  According  to  international  law 
Poland  is  only  a  combatant  party  but  is  not  a  belligerent 
one  because  there  is  only  a  Polish  nation  and  no  Polish 
state.  Hitherto  only  a  Polish  military  representation  is  rec- 
ognized in  the  world-war ;  nevertheless,  the  Polish  Legions 
can  constitute  a  material  as  well  as  a  formal  point  of 
departure  for  the  initiative  in  the  Polish  question  when  the 
future  peace  congress  will  meet.  Poland  hopes  that  the 
conscience  of  the  world  will  awake  and  that  historical  jus- 
tice is  going  to  be  done.  Poland  did  everything  on  her 
part  to  organize  a  military  representation  of  her  own,  and 
it  is  now  Europe's  turn  to  bring  about  the  happiness  of 
humanity  and  the  freedom  of  nations  when  this  awful  war 
will  come  to  an  end. 

The  note  of  Austria-Hungary  with  regard  to  the  Polish 
Legions  has  greatly  alarmed  Russia.  Petrograd  decided 
therefore  at  once  upon  an  attempt  of  organizing  in  Warsaw 
of  Polish  Legions  for  the  purpose  of  combating  against  the 
Germans.  It  was  an  intrigue  intended  for  provoking  a  vol- 
untary fight  between  the  Poles  themselves  and  thus  killing 


—  21  — 


the  Polish  question  from  the  international  point  of  view. 
Organizing  two  military  representations  is  absurd.  The 
danger  for  Poland  was  great  and  because  of  unemployment, 
famine  and  particularly  because  of  the  mistakes  made  by 
the  policy  of  Prussia  with  regard  to  Poland  in  the  times 
preceding  the  war  it  was  comparatively  easy  for  Russia  to 
mislead  individuals.  Poland  is  an  oppressed  country,  with- 
out a  government  after  all,  and  therefore  every  individual 
has  a  free  hand  to  act  as  he  pleases.  Oppression  has  accus- 
tomed the  nation  to  the  principle  of  "liberum  censeo,"  which 
principle  permits  every  individual  to  consider  himself  as  his 
own  governor.  The  level  of  political  enlightenment  of  the 
masses  is  not  equal  in  all  parts  of  Poland,  where,  by  the  way, 
the  schools  are  in  other  hands  than  those  of  the  Poles 
and  where  a  general  oppression  prevails.  Russia  therefore 
determined  to  destroy  what  the  legions  of  Cracow  have 
accomplished  politically.  In  November,  1914,  that  means 
about  four  months  after  the  Polish  Legions  have  crossed 
the  Russian  frontier,  Czar  Nicholas  II  has  commissioned 
his  Chamberlain,  Count  Wielopolski,  to  organize  in  Warsaw 
a  Polish  National  Committee  as  a  competition  to  the  Supreme 
National  Committee  of  Cracow.  The  right  hand  and  in 
fact  the  brain  of  Count  Wielopolski 's  action  was  a  confi- 
dential man  of  the  Russian  Government,  a  former  member 
of  the  Duma,  Roman  Dmowski.  A  portion  of  the  Polish 
nobility  and  of  the  moneyed  bourgeoisie  supported  this 
movement. 

During  all  revolutions  there  were  loyal  parties,  which  dis- 
trusted the  sword  and  were  apt  to  believe  in  deceitful  prom- 
ises. The  French  Revolution  had  its  loyalists  and  so  had  it 
American  revolution  in  times  of  Washington. 

The  first  utterance  of  the  Committee  of  Warsaw  was  the 
proclamation  of  November  25,  1914,  in  which  a  protest  was 


—  22  — 


made  against  the  Supreme  National  Committee :  the  authors 
of  this  proclamation,  however,  did  not  have  the  courage  of 
denying  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  was  "the  only  state 
in  which  our  national  rights  had  met  with  a  measure  of 
recognition."*  The  autonomy  of  Galicia  has  been  in  force 
for  over  half  a  century,  while  the  autonomy  under  Russian 
sovereignty  was  hitherto  only  a  promise  of  the  commander- 
in-chief.  Under  such  conditions  and  because  of  a  number 
of  other  practical  considerations  which  were  explained  above, 
the  Committee  of  Warsaw  was  necessarily  without  real 
backing  among  the  Poles.  All  democratic  parties  refused 
to  support  the  Committee  in  question:  the  latter  tried  to 
gain  in  importance  by  co-operating  with  the  Committee  of 
the  Polish  members  of  the  Russian  Duma  in  Petrograd. 
Russian-Poland  used  to  elect  to  the  Russian  Duma 
only  fourteen  deputies  out  of  a  population  of  12,000,000. 
Besides,  the  election  law  was  of  the  most  reactionary  nature 
and  deprived  the  masses  of  the  people  of  any  influence  what- 
soever. For  these  reasons  the  Poles  boycotted  the  Russian 
Duma  since  the  reactionary  times  of  Stolypin  and  only  the 
nobility  and  certain  elements  of  the  moneyed  bourgeoisie 
took  part  in  the  election.  This  condition  of  things  was  cor- 
rectly estimated  by  the  London  "Times,"  which,  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  and  after  the  declaration  of  loyalty 
on  the  part  of  the  Polish  members  of  the  Duma,  has  ques- 
tioned the  political  value  of  their  move  because  "chosen  on 
the  franchise  and  in  the  conditions  which  exist,"  they  cannot 
"speak  for  the  whole  people."f  The  London  "Times"  is  a 
newspaper  of  high  standing  and  therefore  had  its  doubts, 
which  by  the  way  were  quite  justified,  whether  the  Polish 

*  "Poland,  Russia  and  the  War,"  by  Alma  Tadema,  London  ioij 
page  21. 

t  The  "Times,"  London,  August  17,  1914. 


—  23  — 


nation  will  be  able  "to  forget  1830  and  1863?"  Reality  has 
soon  manifested  itself  in  spite  of  the  artificial  propaganda 
made  by  the  press.  The  Committee  of  Warsaw  supported 
the  Russian  plan  of  organizing  a  Polish  Legion  on  Russia's 
side.  A  most  spirited  propaganda  was  carried  on  for  three 
months  and  failed  completely.  The  nation  did  not  back  up 
the  action,  and  no  army  can  be  raised  on  paper  nor  by  spilling 
streams  of  ink  and  making  a  propaganda.  Several  hundred 
of  misled  volunteers  were  quietly  incorporated  into  the 
Russian  army :  thus  the  entire  undertaking  failed  politically. 
The  Russian  intrigue  came  to  a  naught  and  the  moral  stand- 
ing as  well  as  the  numerical  strength  of  the  Polish  Legion^ 
organized  in  Cracow  was  increased  considerably. 

The  reasons  for  Russia's  failure  in  Warsaw  were  very 
grave  ones.  Russia  promised  autonomy  to  Poland  but  she 
did  not  promise  independence.  While  the  war  that  is  waged 
at  the  present  time  is  conducted  for  the  sake  of  the  liberty 
of  nations  Russia  only  offered  autonomy  which  by  the  way 
was  only  administrative  and  not  legislative.  To  the  Poles 
it  meant  only  uniting  under  one  yoke  instead  of  under  three 
which  was  far  from  being  a  program  of  independence.  All 
illusions  were  swept  away  by  the  Corriere  della  Sera  of 
Milano  which  stated  that  the  Czar  has  purposely  failed  to 
sign  the  proclamation  with  regard  to  the  Polish  cause.*  The 
"Gofos  Moskwy"  confirmed  this  by  betraying  the  fact  that 
the  manifesto  of  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  was  not  backed  up 
at  all  by  the  Russian  Government  and  that  this  was  merely 
a  tactical  move  which  was  required  from  Russia  by  Gen- 
eral Joffre.  The  attitude  of  the  Russian  Government  dur- 
ing the  war  gave  conclusively  justified  the  suspicions  of 
Poland  since  Russia  did  not  cease  for  one  moment  to  ex- 
terminate all  aspirations  for  Polish  independence.  The 
*  "For  a  Lasting  Peace,"  Paris,  1915,  page  23. 


—  24  — 


Russian  Government  has  forbidden  to  put  the  White  Eagle, 
which  is  the  national  emblem  of  Poland,  on  the  flags  of  the 
Legion  that  Russia  attempted  to  organize  in  Warsaw,  and 
even  Polish  national  anthems  were  sternly  prohibited  by 
the  police.*  While  this  was  going  on  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment abolished  autonomy  in  Eastern  Galicia  which  was 
then  occupied  by  the  Russian  armies  and  began  to  proceed 
with  the  russification  of  this  province. 

Eastern  Galicia  never  formed  a  part  of  Russia  and 
belonged  to  Poland  ever  since  1340.  From  the  ethnograph- 
ical point  of  view  it  has  a  mixed  population  the  majority 
of  which  is  Ruthenian  in  the  eastern  district  of  the  said 
province.  This,  however,  does  not  justify  at  all  Russian 
imperialism.  The  Ruthenians  and  the  Russians  have  just 
as  much  in  common  as  the  Belgian  Walons  have  with  France 
or  the  Belgian  Flamands  with  Holland.  Does  this  entitle 
France  or  Holland  to  annex  Belgium?  The  imperialism 
of  Russia,  however,  did  not  possess  any  nationalistic  scru- 
ples in  spite  of  the  fact  that  international  law  does  not 
permit  a  legal  annexation  of  an  occupied  territory.  Count 
Bobrinski,  the  Russian  Governor  of  Eastern  Galicia,  de- 
clared right  upon  his  arrival  in  Lemberg  that  he  "shall 
introduce  here  the  Russian  language,  Russian  law,  the  Rus- 
sian state  administration,"  and  that  "the  Polish  Diet  shall 
not  be  convoked."!  In  consequence  thereof  the  Polish 
university  as  well  as  all  educational  institutions,  both  Polish 
and  Ruthenian,  were  closed  at  once.  Every  possible  auton- 
omy has  been  abolished  at  once  and  instead  the  Russian 
despotic  and  anti-democratic  system  of  government  was 
introduced.  Tshichatshef,  who  advocated  the  separation  of 
the  province  of  Kholm  from  Russian-Poland,  in  the  Russian 

*  "Nowa  Gazeta,"  Warsaw,  November  II,  1914. 
+  "For  a  Lasting  Peace,"  page  23. 


Duma  has  with  a  knowledge  of  the  Russian  Government 
outlined  a  plan  for  colonizing  Galicia  with  Russian  Orth- 
odox peasants.*  Only  the  defeat  of  the  Russian  armies 
and  the  liberation  of  Lemberg  has  saved  Galicia  from  the 
activity  of  the  Russian  "Bank  wloscianski"  which  distin- 
guishes itself  from  the  Prussian  Commission  of  Coloniza- 
tion only  by  the  fact  of  being  older.  Besides  religious  tol- 
erance was  abolished  and  the  Greek  Orthodox  religion  was 
introduced  forcibly.  The  Greek  Catholic  Church  which  for 
centuries  was  united  with  the  Roman  Church  was  slated  as 
a  victim.  And  Russia  attempted  to  introduce  religious  per- 
secution into  Eastern  Galicia  after  having  already  made  a 
bloody  debut  of  a  similar  action  in  the  province  of  Kholm, 
in  Lithuania  and  in  the  Ukraina.  History,  however,  has 
already  passed  a  sentence  on  this  action  of  Russia  by  say- 
ing as  follows :  "In  Poland's  ancient  provinces,  inhabited 
by  the  united  Greeks,  the  government  obliged  the  people  to 
sign  addresses  to  the  Czar,  asking  him  for  the  restoration 
of  the  Orthodox  religion.  Those  who  refused  to  sign  were 
put  into  prison  or  deported.f  The  culminating  point  of  the 
Russian  method  of  converting  to  the  Orthodox  religion, 
was  the  year  1875.  In  Kroze  few  volleys  had  been  fired 
into  praying  crowds  of  Greek  Catholic  worshipers,  and  in 
other  parts  of  Russian-Poland  thousands  of  people  were 
deported  to  Siberia,  and  thus  the  Greek  Catholic  Church 
has  been  destroyed  in  Eastern  Poland.  At  once  after  the 
temporary  occupation  of  Lemberg  by  the  Russian  armies  the 
Russian  Bishop  Eulogius  came  on  a  similar  mission  to  East- 
ern Galicia.  His  action  has  soon  manifested  itself.  The 
"Russkij  Inwalid"  published  in  January,  1915,  the  news  that 
Bishop  Eulogius  had  submitted  to  the  Holy  Synod  in  Petro- 

*  "Nowoje  Wremia,"  Petrograd,  April  15,  1915. 

t  M.  Seignobos  :    "Contemporary  History,"  1910,  page  422. 


—  26  — 


grad  a  report  in  which  he  insisted  upon  "abolishing  in 
Galicia  of  the  spiritual  Greek  Catholic  hierarchy  because 
the  Russian  law  does  not  recognize  the  Greek  Catholic 
Church."* 
Sapicnti  sat. 

"Slavic  brotherhood  and  liberating  the  Poles  from  Prus- 
sian oppression"  proved  in  practice  to  be  nothing  else  but 
introducing  of  Russian  oppression  into  autonomous  Galicia 
which  was  the  last  refuge  of  free  Polish  thought.  The  zeal 
of  Russia  in  this  direction  unfortunately  proved  to  be  a 
universal  one.  No  voice  of  protest  was  raised  by  anybody 
in  Russia  and  once  more  voices  became  loud  suggesting  the 
exclusion  of  the  Polish  question  from  the  questions  to  be 
decided  by  the  future  peace  congress.  The  Russian  reac- 
tionary party  as  well  as  the  progressive  party  joined 
hands  in  order  to  prevent  the  Polish  question  to  become 
something  else  than  "an  internal  problem  of  Slavdom," 
which  in  practice  meant  nothing  else  but  an  internal  problem 
of  the  Russian  Government.  It  is  useless  to  speak  about  the 
reactionary  party  because  its  feelings  toward  Poland  were 
only  too  well  known.  It  was  more  painful  that  even  Briant- 
shaninov,  a  truly  liberal  Russian  politician  agreed  with  the 
reactionary  party  that  "Europe  should  under  no  circum- 
stances take  any  part  in  the  settlement  of  the  mutual 
relations  between  Russia  and  Poland."f  The  progressive 
"Utro  Rossiji"  went  still  further,  and  considered  the  sug- 
gestions of  turning  over  the  Polish  question  for  settlement 
to  England,  France  and  Russia,  even  with  exclusion  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary and  Germany,  as  "illegal  and  criminal,"  be- 
cause the  organization  of  future  Poland  "does  not  of  right 

*  "Goniec."  Warsaw,  January  17,  191 5. 

t  "Kurjer  poranny,"  Warsaw,  March  if,  1915. 


—  27  — 


rest  with  any  congresses  at  all."*  Anybody,  however,  who 
would  suggest  that  the  fate  of  Poland  should  not  depend 
upon  the  mercy  of  the  victor  was  threatened  with  deporta- 
tion to  Siberia. 

Independence  can  either  be  an  absolute  one  or  can  ac- 
quire the  form  of  a  state  within  a  state,  as  such  is  the  case 
with  Hungary  or  with  Bavaria.  Russia  is  opposed  to  such 
either  form  of  independence  as  far  as  Poland  is  concerned. 
Russia  is  afraid  of  an  absolute  independence  of  Poland  be- 
cause such  an  independence  of  Poland  would  keep  Russia 
away  from  Central  Europe  and  would  stop  Russia's  pressure 
on  the  road  leading  through  Vienna  to  Constantinople. 
Russia  is  furthermore  afraid  of  Poland  as  a  state  within  the 
state  under  the  domination  of  Russia  because  the  freedom 
of  Poland  could  turn  out  to  be  contagious  for  Russia  herself 
and  particularly  for  Finland  and  the  Caucasus.  The  free- 
dom of  Poland  is  a  danger  to  reactionary  government  and  to 
despotism.  The  fear  of  progress  prompted  Russia  to  prom- 
ise Poland  in  the  present  war  nothing  else  but  autonomy, 
administrative  and  not  legislative  at  that. 

The  Russian  plan  with  regard  to  Poland  created  an 
impression  in  Western  Europe  and  particularly  in  America, 
because  it  has  promised  the  uniting  of  the  entire  Poland 
under  the  sceptre  of  the  Czar.  The  Russian  plan  has  thus 
promised  one  yoke  instead  of  three  and  has  thus  apparently 
simplified  matters.  All  these  beautiful  phrases,  however, 
concealed  a  truly  Byzantinic  perfidy.  Poland  has  ethno- 
graphical as  well  as  political  boundaries :  the  first  ones  are 
boundaries  of  actual  settlement  while  the  other  ones  are 
boundaries  of  the  Polish  State  which  has  ceased  to  exist. 
Russia  decided  to  apply  to  the  eastern  portion  of  Poland 
the  ethnographical  principle  and  to  the  western  portion  of 
*  "Goniec  wieczorny,"  Warsaw,  January  7,  1915. 


—  28  — 


Poland  the  historical  principle.  Acting  on  this  basis  Russia 
has  separated  before  the  war  the  province  of  Kholm  from 
Russian-Poland,  and  during  the  war,  Eastern  Galicia  from 
Austrian-Poland,  whereby  she  assumed  the  point  of  view 
that  the  territory  settled  by  the  Ruthenians  in  Galicia 
reaches  as  far  as  the  upper  course  of  the  Dunajec.  In  con- 
tradiction with  the  historical  fact  that  neither  the  province 
of  Kholm  nor  Eastern  Galicia  have  ever  formed  a  part  of 
the  Russian  State,  and  in  contradiction  with  the  ethno- 
graphical fact  that  the  Ruthenians  are  not  Russians,  Russia 
considered  the  province  of  Kholm  and  Galicia  as  far  as  the 
course  of  the  upper  Dunajec  as  Russian  territory  and  en- 
deavored to  eliminate  them  from  Polish  influence.  This 
meant  nothing  else  but  cutting  slices  away  from  Poland 
in  the  east  promising  at  the  same  time  to  extend  the  boun- 
daries in  the  west.  For  Kholm,  Lemberg,  Przemysl,  and 
Nowy  Sacz  Russia  promised  to  Poland,  Cracow,  Silesia, 
Posen,  Danzig,  and  Koenigsburg.  Cracow  used  to  be  the 
crowning  place  of  the  Polish  Kings,  Posen  was  the  cradle  of 
Poland,  Danzig  was  Poland's  harbor  on  the  Baltic  Sea, 
Silesia  fell  apart  from  Poland  even  before  the  end  of  the 
Middle  Ages  and  was  not  a  part  of  Poland  at  the  time  of 
Poland's  partitions,  while  Koenigsburg  was  the  capital  of  a 
feudal  principality  of  Poland  and  not  the  capital  of  a  Polish 
province.  Koenigsburg  was  the  capital  of  East  Prussia 
which  was  built  up  in  the  Middle  Ages  by  the  Teutonic 
Knights  during  their  wars  against  Slav  tribes.  The  program 
of  Russia  in  the  west  agreed,  therefore,  with  the  historical 
traditions  of  Poland  and  not  with  the  ethnographical  con- 
siderations. This  program  apparently  flattered  the  Polish 
national  pride  but  in  outlining  this  program  Russia  was 
prompted  by  different  and  very  selfish  reasons.  The  boun- 
daries of  historical  Poland  agree  with  the  boundaries  needed 


—  29  — 


by  Russian  strategical  considerations  on  Russia's  western 
frontier.  These  considerations  form  the  question  of  the 
Vistula  line  of  defence.  The  uniting  of  Polish  territories 
under  the  sceptre  of  the  Czar  would  solve  very  advantage- 
ously for  Russia  the  paradox  of  the  Vistula,  which  before 
the  war  passed  through  three  different  states.  By  uniting 
Poland  the  Vistula  would  become  an  internal  river  of  the 
Russian  Empire  and  the  frontier  would  move  west  as  far 
as  the  upper  Oder.  In  the  first  year  of  this  war  the  Russian 
press  has  on  different  occasions  stated  quite  plainly  that 
strategical  considerations  are  pushing  Russia  as  far  west  as 
Frankfort  on  the  Oder. 

The  forcible  pushing  of  the  frontier  of  future  Poland 
in  the  westerly  direction,  and  at  the  same  time  cutting  off  the 
genuine  Polish  soil  in  its  eastern  part,  raises  the  relative  per 
cent,  of  the  German  element  in  Poland  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  native  element.  Eastern  Prussia  is  inhabited  by 
2,064,175  people,  but  there  are  only  16  per  cent,  of  Poles. 
Eastern  Prussia  never  was  a  Polish  province,  but  only  a 
principality  held  in  feudal  tenure.  In  Western  Prussia  the 
population  numbers  1,703,477,  but  the  per  cent,  of  Poles  is 
35,  especially  so  on  both  banks  of  the  Vistula  River  which 
used  to  be  a  road  to  the  sea  at  the  time  of  the  Polish  kingdom. 
The  Province  of  Posen,  the  cradle  of  the  Polish  state,  has 
2,099,831  people,  and  in  this  number  there  are  only  765,000 
Germans.  The  lower,  middle  and  upper  Silesias  are  in- 
habited by  5,225,962  people.  Poles  inhabit  mostly  upper 
Silesia,  their  number  being  1,158,789.  All  of  these  provinces 
constitute  the  so-called  Prussian  part  of  former  Poland, 
lost  by  Poland  at  the  time  of  her  partition,  or  before  it,  as 
it  was  the  case  with  Silesia  and  Eastern  Prussia.  The  Polish 
population  on  this  entire  area  numbers  3,646,446.  The 
German  population  in  both  Eastern  and  Western  Prussia  is 


—  30  — 


2,922,699;  in  the  Province  of  Posen,  765,000;  in  Silesia 
4,067,173,  totaling  7,754,822.  Consequently  there  are  here 
twice  as  many  Germans  as  Poles.*  The  cause  of  this  pre- 
ponderance of  German  element  is  the  fact  that  Silesia  and 
Eastern  Prussia  were  undergoing  a  process  of  Germaniza- 
tion  still  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  they  did  not  belong  to 
Poland  at  the  time  of  her  partition.  The  Russian  plans  to 
make  the  Vistula  an  internal  river  of  the  Russian  empire  en- 
dangers the  Polish  ethnographical  interests,  since  they  in- 
troduce too  large  a  percentage  of  Germans  into  the  Polish 
organism. 

When  the  ethnographical  data  of  Russian-Poland,  West- 
ern Galicia  and  of  Prussian- Poland,  which  provinces  Russia 
promised  to  reunite,  are  compared,  the  danger  becomes  very 
evident.  The  population  of  Russian-Poland  is  12,467,300, 
of  which  Poles  number  9,115,220;  Germans,  618,590;  Jews, 
1,660,490.  The  population  of  Galicia  is  8,025,675,  Poles 
claim  4,000,000,  Ruthenians  3,674,000  and  Germans  212,000. 
Russia  intends  to  annex  Eastern  Galicia  up  to  the  line  of 
the  lower  San,  lower  Wislock,  and  upper  Dunajec.  In  other 
words,  for  the  "United  Poland"  there  would  be  left  only  two 
"governments,"  that  of  Cracow  and  that  of  Tarnow.  In 
doing  this  Russia  separates  ethnographically  about  2,500,000 
Poles  in  the  middle,  and  Eastern  Galicia  and  leaves  them  a 
prey  to  russification.  This  plan  allows  "United  Poland" 
only  1,500,000  Poles  out  of  Galicia.  The  ethnographical 
aspect  of  Poland  thus  "United"  would  be  as  follows : 

Russian-Poland   9,115,220  Poles 

Western  Galicia   1,500,000  " 

Polish  provinces  retaken  from 

Prussia   3,646,446 

 Total   14,261,666  Poles 

♦According  to  "The  New  International  Yearbook,"  New  York, 
1014,  and  according  to  Polish  statistics. 


—  31  — 


The  number  of  Germans  on  the  same  area  would  be : 

(1)  In  the  parts  retaken  from  Prussia,  7,754,822  people — 
if  Silesia  and  Eastern  Prussia  would  also  be  united  with 
Poland. 

(2)  In  Russian-Poland,  together  with  the  Jews,  2,279,080. 

(3)  In  Western  Galicia  212,000,  and  together  with  those 
Jews  who  do  not  claim  to  be  Poles,  about  500,000. 

The  total  number  of  Germans  and  Jews  in  Poland  "Re- 
united," according  to  the  Russian  prescription,  would  be 
10,533,902. 

It  is  plain  now  that  such  a  plan  only  furthers  German 
interests  if  the  historical  frontiers  of  Poland  are  extended 
in  the  westerly  direction,  while  at  the  same  time  its  eastern 
possessions  are  separated  from  it.  The  Jewish  jargon  is 
only  a  corrupted  German,  and  the  Jews  wi  re  always  in 
middle  Europe,  and  especially  in  Poland,  the  vanguard  of 
Teutonism.  In  defining  the  boundaries  of  Poland,  and  using 
the  ethnographical  key  in  the  east,  and  the  historical  key  in 
the  west,  Russia  would  create  an  ethnographical  paradox,  a 
state  with  a  mixed  population,  where  sooner  or  later  a  serious 
internal  strife  would  be  bound  to  arise.  That  is  what  Russia 
is  aiming  at,  since  then  the  Russian  government  would  play 
■  the  part  of  a  peacemaker.  The  national  strifes  would  render 
the  normal  development  of  the  autonomy  impossible,  and 
would  soon  enable  Russia  to  retake  the  power  to  Petrograd. 
The  life  of  the  promised  autonomy  would  be  a  short  one  and 
the  triumph  of  despotism  early. 

It  is  hard  to  assume  that  Europe  would  permit  of  the 
strategical  occupation  by  Russia  of  the  upper  Oder  River. 
Practically  this  is  the  only  plan  of  occupation  of  the  upper 
Silesia  and  perhaps  of  small  parts  of  the  middle  and  lower 
Silesia.  Under  these  circumstances  the  number  of  Germans 
within  the  boundaries  of  Poland  "United"  by  Russians 


—  32  — 


would  be  lower,  but  the  ratio  would  be  at  any  rate  that 
of  eight  Germans  and  Jews,  to  fourteen  Poles.  This 
is  entirely  too  large  a  ratio  to  reflect  favorably  on  the  in- 
ternal conditions  of  the  future  state.  The  Germans  consti- 
tute a  rich,  capable  and  aggressive  element.  The  Jews  are 
by  no  means  inferior  to  them  as  far  as  aggressiveness  is 
concerned,  and  they  represented  always,  with  their  culture 
and  language,  the  vanguard  of  Germanism  in  middle  Europe. 
Both  of  them  possess  enormous,  financial  resources,  which 
they  would  throw  upon  Poland,  devastated  by  war,  in  order 
to  buy  out  the  land  and  seize  the  industry  with  the  help  of 
foreign  money.  Russia  never  hesitated  in  her  internal  af- 
fairs to  employ  the  Germans  against  the  Poles,  and  still  less 
would  she  hesitate  to  use  them  for  the  annihilation  of  auton- 
omy of  Poland  "United,"  under  the  Czar's  sceptre.  A  terri- 
fying picture  for  Poland!  It  is  by  no  means  an  empty 
phrase  that  the  Jewish  jargon  is  only  corrupted  German, 
and  that  the  Jews  were  and  still  are,  in  middle  Europe,  the 
vanguard  of  Germanism.  Jewish  journalists  frequently 
stated  that  the  Jewish  jargon  "belongs  to  the  great  family 
of  German  languages,  and  that  the  Jews,  despite  the  500 
years  spent  in  the  Slavic  environment,  preserved  the  German 
language,  and  even  to-day  belong  to  the  German  cultural 
stock."*  As  a  consequence  many  of  the  Jewish  leaders,  who, 
up  to  the  time  of  expulsion  of  Russians  from  Galicia,  wooed 
Russia,  now  look  up  to  the  favors  of  victorious  Berlin  that 
it  may  support  Jews  against  Poles,  since  the  Jews  form  in 
Poland  a  "German  cultural  island." 

There  was  a  sly  reservation  in  the  manifesto  in  which 
Nicolai  Nikolayevitsh  promised  Poland  reunion  and  auton- 
omy under  the  sceptre  of  the  Czar — "There  is  but  one  thing 

*  Sonntagsblatt  der  "New  Yorker  Staatszeitung,"  18,  7,  1915.  "Die 
osteuropaeische  Judenfrage  und  der  Krieg,"  by  Dr.  Malamed. 


—  33  — 


that  Russia  expects  from  you,  that  you  respect  the  rights 
of  those  nationalities  with  which  history  has  bound  you." 
This  was  an  attempt  to  check-mate  the  future  of  Poland 
with  the  Jewish  question.  The  Jewish  press  of  the  whole 
world,  basing  itself  on  the  above  manifesto,  started  to  de- 
mand equal  national  rights  for  Jews  in  Poland.  Russia  is 
known  all  over  for  her  antisemitic  feelings.  Up  to  the  latter 
days  of  this  war,  the  Jews  were  not  permitted  to  settle  in 
Russia  proper.  The  area  permitted  for  Jewish  settlement  is 
more  or  less  coincident  with  the  area  of  the  former  Kingdom 
of  Poland.  The  center  of  gravity  of  the  Jewish  question  was 
by  means  of  terrorism  and  pogroms  transferred  toward  the 
Vistula.  As  the  result  of  this  partial  policy  of  Petrograd, 
the  percentage  of  Jews  on  Polish  soil  rose  to  a  higher  degree 
than  anywhere  else.  In  Russian-Poland  the  Jews  constitute 
13.71  per  cent,  of  the  12,464,300  total  population.  In 
Lithuania  and  Polish-Ruthenia  the  percentage  is  somewhat 
higher.  It  is  an  artificial  result  of  the  antisemitic  policy  of 
the  Russian  government  which  routs  the  Jews  from  Russia 
proper  and  takes  "fatherly"  care  of  them  in  Poland.  The 
manifesto  of  Prince  Nikolai  struck  the  same  note,  although 
it  enveloped  it  discreetly  with  an  appeal  to  justice. 

The  public  opinion  in  Russia  saw  through  it  at  once. 
Prince  E.  Trubeckoi,  a  recognized  authority  in  Russian 
political  life,  published  an  address  in  which  he  expressed  his 
satisfaction  and  hope  that  Russia,  after  the  victory,  will  be 
able  to  solve  two  of  her  most  vexing  problems,  namely,  the 
Polish  and  Jewish  question.*  And  Milukoff.  the  leader  of 
the  Liberals  in  Russia,  pointed  out  very  clearly  the  parallel- 
ism of  both  questions  in  his  daring  statement  that  "the  coun- 
try across  the  Vistula  is  not  exclusively  inhabited  by  Poles, 
but  that  there  exists  another  nationality,  the  Jews,  who  have 

*  "Russkoje  Wiedomosti,"  io,  31,  1914. 


—  34  — 


a  right  to  be  considered  as  a  separate  people,  though  being 
in  the  minority."*  The  same  Russia  which  could  not  afford 
to  grant  equal  civic  rights  to  the  Jews  wants  future  Poland 
to  grant  them  more,  namely,  the  recognition  of  separate  na- 
tional rights,  which  Jews  do  not  possess  anywhere  else  in 
Western  Europe,  and  in  America.  Both  the  philosemitic 
progressive  party  and  the  antisemitic  reactionary  party  joined 
hands  in  order  to  sustain  the  former  Russian  policy  toward 
the  Jews,  the  policy  which  can  only  bring  detriment  to  Po- 
land. Instead  of  abolishing  the  boundary  of  Jewish  settle- 
ment in  the  east,  and  granting  the  Jews  equal  civic  rights, 
Russia  wants  to  expand  the  area  of  their  settlement  to  the 
west  in  order  to  create  artificially  with  the  aid  of  Jews  and 
Germans  national  strife  on  the  Vistula,  and  be  able  to  abolish 
under  this  pretext  the  promised  autonomy.  Russia  wants  to 
create  Judeo-Poland  and  thus  facilitate  the  final  russification 
and  destruction  of  Poland. 

In  their  attitude  toward  the  Polish  question,  the  Jews 
joined  hands  with  Russia.  "The  Jewish  press  in  the  Polish 
provinces  welcomed  the  Polish  manifesto  with  almost  hys- 
terical enthusiasm."  The  Jewish  dailies  in  Warsaw  said 
editorially  that  the  Jews  "are  deeply  grateful  to  the  Russian 
commander-in-chief  because  in  his  manifesto  to  the  Poles 
he  did  not  forget  to  mention  the  other  nationalities  whose 
fate  is  bound  up  with  that  of  the  Poles,"  and  it  is  to  be  ex- 
pected "that,  in  accordance  with  the  manifesto,  the  Poles  will 
respect  the  rights  of  the  other  nationalities  within  their  pro- 
vinces."f  Even  in  America,  which  was  the  centre  of  the 
anti-Russian-Jewish  activity,  a  definite  change  can  be  ob- 
served. The  same  Jewish  press,  which  a  few  years  ago  tried 
to  influence  the  government  to  break  off  the  commercial 

*  "The  Globe,"  New  York,  March  I,  1915. 
t  "The  Day,"  February  18,  1915. 


—  35  — 


treaties  with  Russia,  is  now  elated  by  "Purishkewitsh,  the 
Black  Hundred  Leader  in  the  Duma,  having  kissed  the  scroll 
of  Torah."*    They  started  in  this  war  a  general  white- 
washing of  Russia  and  a  simultaneous  slandering  of  Poland 
intimating  that  "the  pogrom  policy  abandoned  by  the  Russian 
government  was  taken  up  in  another  form  by  the  Poles  !"+ 
A  whole  machinery  of  slander  and  impudent  lies  was  set  in 
motion  so  as  to  finish  up  the  unfortunate  nation  visited  by 
all  the  calamities  of  the  present  war. 
With  lies,  however,  one  cannot  go  far. 
The  note  of  the  Jewish  Bund  proved  beyond  doubt  that 
there  were  never  any  pogroms  in  Poland  arranged  by  Poles 
In  December,  1914,  Mr.  Herman  Bernstein  publicly  an- 
nounced that  "the  Poles  resolved  to  methods  of  barbarism 
in  their  policy  of  Jew-hatred— their  hands  are  smeared  with 
the  blood  of  the  Jews  in  Poland ;  a  nation  of  pogrom-makers 
is  unworthy  of  independence.''^    About  a  year  afterward, 
when  the  same  Mr.  Bernstein  returned  from  Europe,  he 
ceased  to  speak  about  the  "Polish  pogroms,"  and  at  the  first 
interview  when  landing  on  the  continent  attested  that  "for 
their  military  defeat  on  the  battlefield,  the  Russian  authori- 
ties made  military  pogroms  against  their  own  peaceful  Jew- 
ish population. "§    The  main  argument  that  Poles  instigated 
Russian  soldiers  to  the  pogroms  is  puerile  and  ludicrous. 
Russia  having  in  her  record  Kishenieff,  Siedlce  and  Bialy- 
stok  does  not  need  any  instigation.    In  spite  of  that,  the 
Jewish  press  does  not  stop  flirting  with  Puriskewitsh,  al- 
though the  latter  is  a  deputy  from  Kishenieff,  and  endeavors 
to  direct  public  opinion  against  the  independence  of  Poland. 

*  "New  York  Sun,"  and  "The  Day,"  2,  18, 1915. 

1 1.  c,  Bernstein  Herman. 

%  "The  Day,"  December  13,  1914. 

§  "The  New  York  Times,"  October  18, 1915. 


—  36  — 


These  are  the  facts  which  show  plainly  that  the  Jews  aid  the 
Russian  project  of  solving  the  Polish  question  and  try  to 
subdue  the  independence  of  Poland.  The  Jews  themselves 
do  not  believe  in  any  change  in  Russia,  and  that  is  the  reason 
why  they  would  gladly  welcome  the  expansion  of  their  settle- 
ment in  the  westerly  direction  in  Poland,  remaining  at  the 
same  time  in  connection  with  Russia.  In  the  internal  politics 
they  would  be  certain  of  the  German  aid,  because  in  Poland 
the  Jews  are  always  the  vanguard  of  Germanism.  As  far  as 
commerce  is  concerned,  they  calculate  on  the  capture  of  the 
eastern  markets  in  Asia.  In  the  wake  of  the  Russian  sword, 
if  the  latter  were  capable  of  opening  the  gates  of  Constan- 
tinople, Jewish  money  would  pour  into  China  and  India 
where  it  would  displace  the  capital  of  the  Western  European 
nations  and  pave  the  way  for  the  Russian  army.  Thus  the 
Russian  imperialism  and  the  Jewish  commercial  expansion 
were  brought  close  together  in  the  present  war. 

Poland  was  always  friendly  to  Jews,  especially  the  demo- 
cratic, aspiring  Poland.  In  the  insurrection  of  1863  the 
Jew,  Wohl,  was  the  treasurer  of  the  national  government, 
and  the  banker,  Kronenberg,  was  one  of  the  important  per- 
sonages. Before  the  very  outbreak  of  the  uprising,  when 
the  Russian  soldiers  were  shooting  at  the  Polish  church 
procession  on  the  streets  of  Warsaw  as  it  emerged  from  the 
cathedral  of  St.  John,  the  cross  which  fell  from  the  hands 
of  a  Pole  shot  dead  by  a  Russian  soldier  was  picked  up  by 
a  Jew  and  the  demonstration  was  led  by  a  Jew.  It  was  only 
due  to  Russian  influence  that  the  friendly  relations  between 
Poles  and  Jews  were  brought  to  an  end.  Russophilism  and 
antisemitism  in  Poland  are  but  two  aspects  of  the  same  thing. 
Roman  Dmowski,  who  in  the  present  war  was  the  main- 
spring of  the  Russophilic  committee,  was,  before  the  war, 
the  leader  of  the  antisemitic  movement.   The  attitude  of  the 


—  37  — 


Jews  toward  the  Polish  cause  proved  to  be  identical  with 
that  of  the  Russophilic  antisemites  in  Warsaw.  Democratic 
Poland  fighting  for  her  liberty  is  just  as  Anti-Russian 
as  it  is  not,  and  never  was,  antisemitic.  This  question  has 
been  sifted  during  the  present  war  by  Prof.  Dr.  W.  L. 
Jaworski,  the  president  of  the  Polish  Supreme  National 
Committee : 

"Antisemitism,  no  matter  in  what  form  it  would  appear, 
might  bring  only  an  injury  to  our  national  interests.  The 
shortcomings  of  the  Polish  commerce  and  industry  can 
neither  be  removed  by  antisemitism  nor  by  national  dem- 
agogism;  they  could  be  removed  only  by  wide  reforms  that 
would  enable  them  to  establish  better  hygiene  of  the  inner 
social  and  economic  relations  in  general ;  that  would  raise 
the  standard  of  culture  among  the  wide  masses,  and  that 
would  offer  new  openings  for  new  fields  in  industry  and  for 
general  development. 

"Only  frank  and  decided  declaration  that  regenerated 
Poland  would  not  maintain  the  policy  of  antisemitism,  the 
policy  of  chicanery  and  persecution,  might  help  to  make 
Jews  better  citizens  on  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand  it 
would  check  the  wide  anti-Polish  crusade  carried  on  now  by 
Jews  abroad.  Leaving  Russia  and  turning  to  Western 
Europe,  Poland  must  follow  the  example  given  by  the  coun- 
tries of  Western  Europe  in  solving  the  Jewish  question, 
namely,  Poland  must  gain  sympathy  of  Jews  by  granting 
them  equal  rights  of  citizens.  At  the  same  time,  we  must 
emphatically  demand  of  Jews  that  they  become  the  true 
citizens  of  the  country — that  they  act  for  the  interest  of  the 
country,  and  work  for  her  development.  This  end  could  be 
secured  only  by  giving  the  Jews  in  Poland  access  to  the 
sources  of  welfare  and  culture.  As  in  Western  Europe, 
Jews  have  become  either  good  Frenchmen,  Englishmen, 


—  38  — 


Italians  or  Germans,  so  we  have  the  right,  too,  to  demand  of 
our  Polish  Jews  to  become  good  Poles  and  be  real  good 
citizens  of  Poland." 

Poland  cannot  and  will  not  recognize  any  hyphenated 
Poles ! 

For  the  sake  of  historical  accuracy,  I  take  the  liberty  to 
assert  that  the  attack  of  the  Jewish  press  on  Poland,  not  only 
here  in  America,  but  also  all  over  the  world,  was  made  sud- 
denly and  without  any  endeavor  on  the  part  of  the  Jews  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  the  Polish  Supreme  Na- 
tional Committee  regarding  the  policy  of  future  Poland  on 
the  Jewish  question.  The  enmity  of  the  Jews  against  the 
Poles  plainly  manifested  itself  in  this  country  of  free  speecii 
and  free  press,  by  the  failure  to  insert  vindications  of  the 
Poles  against  a  wave  of  calumnies  thrown  at  the  Polish  na- 
tion, the  first  step  being  made  by  George  Brandes,  who  wrote 
an  open  and  most  unjust  letter.  Jewish  nationalists  were 
very  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  Poland,  not  being  anti- 
semitic  in  general  as  a  nation,  must,  however,  be  anti- 
zionistic  when  the  zionism  or  Jewish  nationalism  endeavors 
with  Russian  or  German  aid  to  create  the  Judeo-Poland. 

Those  who  think  that  the  Jewish  question  in  Poland  means 
an  antagonism  against  the  Jews  are  grossly  mistaken.  It  is 
something  entirely  different,  inasmuch  as  the  war  made  on 
the  Polish  nation  by  the  Jewish  nationalistic  party  all  over 
the  world  tends  to  obtain  for  the  Jews  in  Poland  not  the 
rights  of  equal  citizenship,  but  a  recognition  of  a  distinct  na- 
tional franchise  in  order  to  make  of  Poland  a  country  of 
mixed  nationality  and  thus  to  create,  with  the  help  of  Russia, 
a  precedent  for  the  revision  of  the  entire  Jewish  question  in 
Europe  and  possibly  also  in  America  in  the  near  future.  The 
following  quotation  may  serve  as  an  illustration :  "In  order 
that  Jews  may  be  assured  of  equality  in  civil  and  political 


—  39  — 


life  it  is  essential  that  they  be  accorded  recognition  as  a  na- 
tional group  in  Poland,"  and  "it  is  hardly  probable  that  any 
sensible  Jew  will  object  to  the  Jewish  demand  for  equal 
recognition  with  the  Ruthenians,  the  Czechs,  the  Slavs  of 
the  Austrian  Empire."* 

The  attitude  of  the  whole  world  toward  the  Jewish  ques- 
tion can  be  expressed  by  the  formula  of  the  French  revolu- 
tion :  "The  Jews  as  a  nation  should  be  deprived  of  every- 
thing, but  the  Jews  as  men  should  be  assured  of  every- 
thing."f  This  is  the  principle  of  equal  civic  rights  for  Jews 
without  granting  them  separate  national  rights.  Contrary  to 
this,  the  Jews  demand  in  future  Poland  equal  recognition  for 
their  jargon  as  a  national  tongue.  Even  Western  Europe 
has  not  as  yet  grown  up  to  the  national  concubinage,  and 
Poland  is  still  less  ready  to  outdo  the  whole  world  in  the 
Jewish  question.  Jewish  nationalism  does  not  lie  within  the 
practical  political  demands.  Natura  non  facit  salttis.  The 
development  of  democracy  in  Europe  must  at  first  separate 
the  idea  of  national  consciousness  from  the  idea  of  owning 
the  soil.  Only  then  will  it  be  possible  for  a  nation  to  exist 
within  a  nation.  At  present  the  whole  world  stands  on  the 
basis  of  the  principle  of  the  French  revolution,  and  Poland, 
being  in  the  throes  of  this  terrible  war,  cannot  indulge  in 
risky  experiments. 

Russia  understands  that  in  case  of  her  eventual  victory 
over  the  Germans,  there  will  come  a  time  when  the  Germans 
will  start  the  war  of  retaliation — no  matter  what  key  Russia  is 
going  to  use  in  making  the  frontiers  of  the  "United  Poland." 
Both  the  ethnographical  and  the  historical  keys  bring  Russia 
closer  to  Berlin.  The  victory  of  Russia  would  not  weaken 
Germany  as  much  as  it  would  weaken  Prussia  within  the 

*  "Dos  Yidische  Folk,"  New  York,  November  12, 1915. 
f  Clermon  Tonners,  21,  12,  1789,  in  the  National  Assembly. 


—  40  — 


German  empire.  Prussia  cannot  submit  to  this  weakening 
for  any  length  of  time  and  she  will  not  lack  means  and 
cleverness  to  draw  the  German  empire  into  her  plans  of 
revenge.  Russia  must  take  into  account  that  the  German  war 
of  revenge  in  the  east  will  have  the  support  of  England, 
since  England  is  the  enemy  of  German  ambitions  on  the  sea 
and  in  colonial  enterprises,  but  she  is  not  Germany's  rival  on 
land,  and  especially  not  in  Eastern  Europe.  England,  after 
having  defeated  Germany  on  the  sea,  and  having  ousted  the 
Germans  from  Belgium,  will  gladly  attack  the  victorious 
Russia  with  German  hands  on  the  first  occasion,  so  as  not 
to  permit  the  excessive  overgrowth  of  Russia.  These  are 
the  factors  which  guide  Russia's  policy  in  Poland  in  the 
present  war.  Russia  must,  due  to  her  aggressive  traditions, 
gravitate  toward  the  Oder,  and  the  road  to  the  Oder  leads 
over  the  Mazurian  Lakes  and  Carpathian  Mountains.  This 
tendency  is  couched  in  Russian  diplomatic  language  in  the 
phrase — "Uniting  Poland  under  the  sceptre  of  the  Czar." 
In  reality  it  means  the  securing  of  her  eventual  western 
frontiers,  in  order  to  make  the  best  use  of  her  numerical 
superiority  in  the  future  inevitable  retaliatory  war  with 
Germany  and  Austria.  Politically  the  Russian  plan  tries  to 
poison  Poland  with  an  excess  of  Germans  and  Jews,  which 
process  would  facilitate  the  digestion  of  the  occupied  terri- 
tories and  absolute  conquest  of  the  Vistula. 

The  game  has  been  going  on  for  a  year. 

There  was  no  greater  strategical  mistake  on  the  part  of 
Russia  than  her  victory  over  Hindenburg  at  Warsaw.  Hin- 
denburg's  offensive  was  merely  a  strategical  provocation  to 
draw  the  centrum  of  the  Russian  army  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Vistula,  and  then  to  threaten  with  flank  attacks  both 
Russian  wings,  and  not  permitting  any  movement  westward 
for  fear  of  losing  the  lines  of  communication.    The  defence 


—  41  — 


of  Warsaw  was  the  beginning  of  the  defeat  of  Russia  on  the 
Vistula.  The  paradox  of  the  Vistula,  Austria  holding  the 
upper  course,  Russia  the  middle,  and  Germany  the  lower, 
proved  its  inherent  danger.  The  strategical  road  toward  the 
west  does  not  run  through  Warsaw  so  long  as  Cracow  and 
Danzig  do  not  belong  to  the  aggressor.  Dragomirow,  Hurko 
and  Kuropatkin  were  right  in  advising  Russia  to  follow 
Kutuzow's  plan  which  originated  in  his  combat  with  Napo- 
leon. With  the  Mazurian  Lakes  in  the  north  and  the  Car- 
pathian passes  in  the  south,  endangering  both  wings  of  the 
Russian  army,  Russia  cannot  attack  successfully  either 
Vienna  or  Berlin.  The  Russian  offensive  movement  through 
Warsaw  forces  the  Russian  army  to  assume  an  arched  posi- 
tion, with  the  center  directed  toward  the  west  and  both 
flanks  running  backwards,  one  along  the  Mazurian  Lakes 
and  the  other  along  the  Carpathian  Mountains.  Such  a 
strategical  position  is  synonymous  with  defeat.  With  Poland 
divided  into  three  parts  and  the  strategical  difficulty  of  the 
Vistula  created  thereby,  the  only  way  for  Russia  to  victory 
is  to  follow  Kutuzow's  method  and  retire  beyond  the  Niemen 
and  Bug  rivers.  Strategically  it  means  the  evacuation  of 
Russian-Poland  in  the  first  period  of  the  war.  Politically  it 
signifies  the  superfluity  of  Russian-Poland  for  Russia.  The 
Russian  rule  over  Poland  has  no  political,  no  historical,  no 
moral  basis,  not  even  a  strategical  one.  For  Poland  it  means 
injury,  for  Russia  it  means  an  unnecessary  burden  of  false 
imperialism.  History  administered  justice  to  Russia  by  her 
terrible  defeat,  and  gave  her  warning  for  the  future.  Only 
an  independent  Poland  can  solve  easily  the  strategical  diffi- 
culty of  the  Vistula. 

The  independence  of  Poland  has  not  only  a  historical 
foundation,  but  also  a  strategical  one.  The  partition  of 
Poland  renders  the  Russian  offensive  westward  impossible. 


—  42  — 


In  the  present  condition  of  Poland,  the  road  to  Vienna  or 
Berlin  does  not  lead  through  Warsaw;  on  the  contrary, 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  dominate  the  Russian  line  of 
fortresses  of  Warsaw,  Deblin*  and  Modlin,t  as  long  as  they 
possess  the  Mazurian  Lakes  and  the  Carpathian  Mountains, 
while  the  road  toward  the  east  is  open  for  them.  This  is  the 
fundamental  contrast  in  the  strategical  interests  of  Germany 
and  Austria  on  one  side,  and  Russia  on  the  other.  This 
contrast  can  only  be  removed  by  the  independence  of  Poland. 
Let  us  assume  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  Poland  will  be 
restored  after  the  present  war.  In  the  future  war  of  retalia- 
tion, Poland  by  the  power  of  her  existence  only  will  defend 
Russia  against  an  out-flanking  movement  from  the  side  of 
the  Mazurian  Lakes  and  Carpathian  Mountains.  Poland 
remaining  neutral,  the  territory  about  the  middle  of  the 
Vistula  cannot  be  made  the  field  of  military  operations.  It 
is  hardly  conceivable,  however,  that  Poland  could  stay  neu- 
tral in  such  a  war.  It  will  be  the  war  for  the  possession  of 
the  Vistula  line!  If  we  assume  that  Poland  would  turn 
against  Russia,  then  the  line  of  conflict  will  be  formed  by 
the  rivers  Niemen,  Bug  and  Dniester.  In  other  words,  Rus- 
sia will  be  free  from  danger  of  flank  attacks  upon  her  wings 
and  will  have  the  possibility  of  the  frontal  attack  in  the 
westerly  direction.  In  case  Poland  would  turn  against 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  Warsaw  would  be  in  danger 
of  a  flanking  attack  from  the  side  of  the  Mazurian  Lakes 
and  Carpathian  Mountains,  which  fact  equalizes  in  favor  of 
Germany  and  Austria  the  numerical  superiority  of  Russia. 
The  new  partition  of  Poland  between  Austria  and  Germany 
will  deprive  them  of  the  possibility  of  the  flanking  move- 
ment, since  it  will  not  restore  Poland  but  only  remove  Russia 


*  Ivangorod. 

t  Novo-Georgievsk. 


—  43  — 


from  Warsaw.  This  will  only  be  favorable  for  Russia, 
since  it  will  facilitate  her  eventual  frontal  attack  on  the 
whole  line,  leaving  her  flanks  secure  in  a  good  strategical 
position.  Only  the  neutrality  of  independent  Poland  may 
be  a  factor  for  insuring  a  permanent  peace,  since  it  will 
render  difficult  the  Russian  offensive  toward  the  west,  as 
well  as  that  of  Austria  and  Germany  toward  the  east.  Be- 
sides this,  a  line  of  Polish  fortresses  on  the  Niemen,  Bug 
and  Dniester  would  also  materially  assist  in  guaranteeing 
peace. 

There  is  a  difference  in  power  a  free  nation  can  display 
from  that  of  an  enslaved  nation.  The  free  and  independent 
Poland  will  soon  become  the  center  of  Slavic  creative  power 
in  harmony  with  the  interests  of  Western  Europe,  and  with- 
out political  Russophilism.  Poland  even  now  neutralizes 
the  Russian  influence  in  the  Slavic  world,  since  she  is  an 
older  historical  unit  than  Russia.  The  Balkan  states  are 
free,  but  their  civilization  is  inferior  to  that  of  Russia  and 
that  is  why  the  Balkans  are  such  favorable  soil  for  Russian 
political  propaganda.  The  equilibrium  of  Europe  can  only 
be  maintained  by  the  division  of  the  Slavic  world.  In  War- 
saw, the  Roman  cross  and  the  traditions  of  Rome ;  in  Mos- 
cow, and  on  the  Dnieper,  the  cross  and  the  traditions  of 
Constantinople.  This  does  not  mean  the  separation  of  two 
religious  systems  only.  Two  different  cultures,  sympathies, 
arts,  and  finally,  two  different  forms  of  political  law  should 
be  separated  from  each  other.  Constantinople  was  the 
breeding  place  of  the  Caesarian  despotism;  Rome,  on  the 
other  side,  due  to  the  strife  between  the  Papacy  and  the 
Roman  emperors,  was  the  source  of  the  emancipation  of 
states  and  nations  and  in  the  last  instance  of  the  citizen.  All 
these  factors  constitute  the  boundary  line  between  the  civil- 
ization of  Western  Europe  and  that  of  Russia.    Poland  al- 


—  44  — 


ways  was  the  vanguard  of  the  west.  Poland  was  the  father- 
land of  Copernicus,  "who  stopped  the  sun  in  its  course." 
The  investigation  of  Birkenmajer  in  the  archives  of  Stock- 
holm settled  finally  the  nationality  of  Copernicus  in  favor 
of  Poland.*  The  system  of  Copernicus  forms  the  basis  of 
the  modern  conception  of  the  universe.  If  it  had  not  been 
for  Copernicus,  Newton  could  not  have  accomplished  his 
work  or  he  would  have  to  be  Copernicus  first.  The  physics 
of  Gallileo  is  also  the  echo  of  the  work  of  Copernicus.  Po- 
land had  no  freedom  for  the  last  hundred  years.  Oppres- 
sion restrained  the  Polish  schools  and  made  it  very  difficult 
for  the  Polish  nation  to  participate  in  the  great  work  of 
civilization.  Illiteracy  and  misery  are  set  loose  in  Poland 
and  have  all  the  prospects  of  unlimited  development  which 
is  denied  to  science  and  enterprise.  Poland  is  not  permitted 
to  study  and  work.  Such  is  the  curse  of  life  in  slavery ! 
The  Polish  creative  genius  could  not,  however,  be  sup- 
pressed. Chopin's  music  and  Mickiewicz's  poetry  already 
after  the  downfall  of  Poland  became  the  common  spiritual 
good  of  the  whole  world.  Sienkiewicz  and  Curie-Sklodowski 
won  Nobel  prizes.  In  the  scientific  circles  of  the  world 
are  known  the  names  of  Smoluchowski,  Raciborski,  March- 
lewski,  Godlewski,  Morozewicz,  Romer,  Abramowski,  Roz- 
wadowski,  Zaremba,  Olszewski,  Kostanecki,  Ochorowicz, 
and  numerous  others.  That  is  the  achievement  of  a  nation 
of  20,000,000  people  and  possessing  but  two  universities, 
one  in  Cracow  and  one  in  Lemberg.  As  soon  as  the  Russian 
army  occupied  Lemberg,  one  of  the  first  steps  taken  was  the 
closing  of  the  Polish  University.  Warsaw,  a  Western  Euro- 
pean city  in  the  real  sense  of  the  word,  in  tradition  and  cul- 
ture, a  city  numbering  about  1,000,000  inhabitants,  the 
capital  city  of  20,000,000  people,  having  a  glorious  and  great 
*  Expedition  of  Cracow's  Academy  of  Sciences. 


—  45  — 


history,  did  not  possess  a  university !  This  was  a  fact  which 
humiliated  western  civilization,  and  for  this  civilization  in 
general  has  to  be  thankful  to  Russia,  which  proclaimed  in 
this  way  the  "Slavic  Brotherhood"  on  the  Vistula.  Liberty 
will  stimulate  the  Polish  genius  and  this  will  enrich  the  world 
with  new  elements,  and  the  Polish  nation  will  regain  the 
power  to  "play  the  part  in  Europe  to  which  it  is  entitled  by 
its  numbers,  its  culture,  and  its  genius."* 

The  Congress  of  Vienna  recognized  and  based  its  work 
upon  the  principle  of  legitimism.  It  was  the  conservative  idea 
contrary  to  all  the  achievements  of  the  Napoleonic  era. 
Legitimism  did  not  recognize  the  will  of  the  nation ;  it  sup- 
ported legitimate  authority,  especially  monarchy,  on  the 
grounds  of  hereditary  rights.  Belgium  was  returned  to  the 
Netherlands,  the  principality  of  Warsaw  was  annihilated, 
and  Italy  redivided.  This  cast  the  seeds  for  the  revolution 
in  Belgium,  and  the  still  more  sanguine  uprising  in  Poland. 
Italy  had  to  have  her  Garibaldi.  May  the  future  peace  con- 
gress not  repeat  the  mistakes  of  the  Congress  in  Vienna ! 
Russia  still  to-day  does  not  recognize  the  rights  of  nations 
in  practice,  placing  the  race  above  the  rights  of  a  nation,  a 
principle  very  much  inferior  to  the  principle  of  legitimism. 
To  Poland  Russia  promises  autonomy  in  internal  adminis- 
tration. This  is  less  than  the  Congress  of  Vienna  did,  and 
which  transformed  the  principality  of  Warsaw  into  a  state 
within  a  state  and  did  not  only  make  an  autonomic  province 
of  it.  Poland  hopes  that  if  ever  a  future  congress  should 
not  make  it  a  sovereign  state,  it  will  at  least  deal  with  her 
according  to  the  Vienna  treaties,  and  will  not  allow  ap- 
proaching the  Polish  problem  on  the  basis  of  the  manifesto 
of  Duke  Nikolas.   The  Congress  of  Vienna,  although  taking 

*"The  Manchester  Guardian,"  19,  12,  1915.— "The  New  Poland," 
by  Bruce  Boswell,  of  Liverpool  University. 


—  46  — 

the  principle  of  legitimism  as  the  point  of  issue,  granted 
Poland  the  character  of  a  state  within  a  state;  a  separate 
diet,  an  army,  it  obliged  the  Russian  Czar  to  crown  himself 
Polish  King  in  Warsaw.  Will  the  future  congress,  which 
will  assemble  under  the  banner  of  freedom  for  nations,  have 
the  courage  to  step  below  this  principle  when  dealing  with 
the  Polish  question  ? 

The  attitude  of  Poles  as  a  nation  devoid  of  political  liberty 
was  determined  by  real  facts  and  not  by  sympathies : 

I.  — Administrative  and  legislative  autonomy  existed  in 

Galicia  while  Russian  and  German  Poland  did  not 
enjoy  these  advantages. 

II.  — Private  military  schools  could  only  be  established 

in  Galicia.  Consequently,  Polish  youths  from 
Russian  and  Prussian-Poland  went  to  Galicia 
since  in  the  former  two  provinces  any  military 
work  had  to  be  secretly  carried  on,  and,  conse- 
quently, not  very  effectively.  The  beginning  of 
this  political  system  dates  back  to  the  years  1876-8, 
when  with  the  unofficial  aid  of  England  an  up- 
rising against  Russia,  in  alliance  with  Austro- 
Hungary,  was  organized. 

III.  — Only  in  Russian-Poland,  on  the  left  bank  of  the 

Vistula,  were  there  enough  recruits  for  the  Polish 
military  representation  in  the  case  of  European 
war,  since  Russia  had,  for  strategical  reasons,  to 
evacuate  the  western  governments  of  Russian 
Poland  with  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  this 
prevented  the  Russian  authorities  to  mobilize  in 
the  mining  and  industrial  districts  of  Russian- 
Poland. 

IV.  — During  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  one  hundred 

years  ago,  England  entered  into  a  secret  treaty 


—  47  — 


with  France  and  Austria  against  Russia,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  Russia  was  a  faithful  ally  of  Eng- 
land in  her  war  against  Napoleon. 

V.  — At  the  Congress  in  Vienna,  England  supported  the 

Polish  interests  against  Russia,  although  the  Pol- 
ish regiments  were  fighting  with  Napoleon  against 
England. 

VI.  — Poland  wanted  and  could  form  a  military  repre- 

sentation only  against  Russia  and  in  alliance  with 
Austria-Hungary.  That  it  was  practicable  was 
proven  by  the  development  of  the  Polish  legions 
in  Cracow  and  an  absolute  failure  of  Russian  en- 
deavors in  Warsaw  to  form  a  competitory  legion. 

VII.  — Russia  occupies  80  per  cent,  of  the  historical 

Polish  territory,  and  Warsaw  is  the  capital  city 
of  Poland.    Under  these  conditions  the  war  of 
Austria  with  Prussia  in  1866  could  not,  and  did 
not  revive  the  Polish  question,  but  the  possibility 
of  war  between  Austria  and  Russia  was  always 
and  must  always  be  associated  with  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  Polish  uprising  against  Russia  and 
in  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary. 
VIII —The  military  interests  in  the  present  war  do  not 
coincide  with  the  political  interests,  consequently 
the  formation  of  the  Polish  legions  against  Rus- 
sia, and  in  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary,  does 
not  free  any  one  from  the  obligation  of  supporting 
the  Polish  independence. 
Poland  went  along  the  way  of  her  ratio  status  and  of 
practical  possibilities.    She  could  not  forget  for  a  moment 
that  Warsaw  is  not  Antwerp,  and  that  Warsaw  is  not  located 
in  front  of  London  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel.  Eng- 
land must  fight  in  order  to  support  Belgium,  but  England 


—  48  — 


may  limit  the  support  of  the  Polish  question  to  the  war  on 
paper.  The  Polish  uprising  in  1830  broke  out  when  Czar 
Nikolas  I,  in  the  name  of  the  reactionary  principle  of  legit- 
imism, wanted  to  send  the  Polish  army  to  Belgium  in  order 
to  crush  her  struggle  for  independence.  That  did  not  in- 
fluence England  in  the  following  year  to  save  Warsaw  from 
the  Russian  superior  forces,  although  it  was  Warsaw  which 
saved  Belgium.  The  blood  of  the  Polish  heroes  of  the  upris- 
ing of  1863  created  nothing  more  than  sympathy  in  Western 
Europe.  The  Congress  of  Vienna  obliged  not  only  Russia 
but  also  Prussia  to  respect  the  rights  of  the  Polish  nation. 
Prussia  at  the  time  of  Bismarck  adopted  the  anti-Polish 
policy  in  the  Province  of  Posen.  Bismarck  did  not  like  the 
sea,  so  England  preferred  to  keep  quiet  and  to  forget  diplo- 
matically the  treaty  of  Vienna.  On  November  9,  1896,  a 
Prussian  order  was  issued,  changing  the  Polish  flag  cf  the 
Province  of  Posen  and  substituting  it  with  the  Prussian 
colors.  On  February  10,  1897,  Minister  Von  der  Recke 
made  a  brutal  speech  in  the  Prussian  diet  defending  the 
above  order.  England  remained  silent;  still  worse,  she 
preferred  to  terrorize  France  in  her  Fashoda  dispute,  instead 
of  claiming  of  Berlin  the  observance  of  the  treaties  of 
Vienna  concerning  the  Polish  rights.  England  did  not  for- 
get her  treaties  with  Belgium,  but  alas,  how  soon  she  did 
forget  those  concerning  the  Polish  cause.  Nobody  enters 
war  for  someone  else's  pleasure;  nobody  sheds  the  blood  of 
his  nation  for  the  other  people's  interests  only.  Such  is  the 
logic  and  truth  of  history.  Poland  understands  it,  but  she 
wants  also  other  nations  to  understand  her  position.  If 
those,  who  in  the  present  war  proclaimed  the  watchword  of 
the  independence  of  nations,  are  sincere,  Poland  hopes  that 
the  future  peace  congress  will  adopt  one  of  two  alternatives  : 


—  49  — 


I.  — Either  absolute  independence  of  Poland,  or 

II.  — Restoration  of  Poland  as  a  state  within  another 

state. 

Both  alternatives  prohibit  the  submittance  of  Polish  ter- 
ritory to  another  dismemberment. 

The  union  of  the  Polish  provinces  under  the  sceptre  of 
the  Czar,  and  on  the  basis  of  the  manifesto  of  the  Grand 
Duke  Nikolas,  will  be,  in  spite  of  all  appearances,  only  an 
injustice  to  Poland.  A  Polish  state  within  a  federation  of 
German  states  would  be  an  anomaly.  A  Polish  state  in 
union  with  Austria-Hungary  on  the  basis  of  a  triple  union 
would  be  a  favorable  solution  of  the  problem.  But  happi- 
ness and  full  justice  can  only  be  brought  about  by  absolute 
independence,  since  this  form  of  political  existence  was  lost 
by  Poland  due  to  the  "crime"  of  the  partition.* 

The  hurricane  of  war  which  at  present  envelops  Warsaw 
with  the  cloud  of  smoke  rising  from  the  battlefields,  and 
with  rivers  of  blood  spilled  in  the  greatest  war  of  the  ages 
will  give  birth  to  Poland's  future.  And  above  this  blood- 
soaked  soil  of  Poland  the  Polish  legions  unfurled  their  ban- 
ner of  Red  and  White,  and  await  the  help  of  all  nations 
having  the  good  will  to  help. 


*  Clemenceau. 


